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Abstract
Malware is a growing concern in the modern connected and machine-dependent world. A com-
mon approach to fighting malware is early detection. This is the approach used by most antivirus
products. On the other side, malware authors try to keep their software undetected as long as pos-
sible in order to achieve their goals. One technique used for this is the use of packers. The ease
of use and the protections against detection and analysis that packers provide have made packing
malware very popular. An unavoidable fact is that the large majority of malware is packed. The
varying complexity of packers from simple compressors to extremely advanced virtual machines
have forced the IT security industry to address the problem seriously. The reduced effectiveness
of detection on packed binaries is a known problem that the industry tries to solve using different
techniques. Static unpacking provides an extremely efficient way of addressing the problem of
packed executables. This approach relies on reversing the changes done by the packer to the bi-
nary, without executing it. The goal of this project was to implement a static unpacking framework
that would allow the unpacking of packed executables. The occurrence of a multitude of different
packer families and versions meant that such a tool should allow the incremental addition of sup-
port for different packers. Due to the lack of information on the different packers, implementing
an unpacker usually involves reverse engineering of its functionality. This was the main challenge
of this project.
A static unpacking framework was implemented. Support for four different packers was added the
framework: ACProtect 1.41, ASPack 2.12, FSG 2.0, and UPX.
The ultimate purpose of the developed framework was to be integrated into a malware scanning
engine, so that unpacking of packed executables could be performed before scanning. This in-
tegration was performed and the implemented framework was thoroughly tested with malware
samples identified as packed by PEiD signatures. From this testing, the success of the imple-
mented unpackers varied from 86% to 0,015%. These success rates are tightly linked with the
quality and precision of the PEiD signatures used to select the testing sample sets and therefore
have a relative significance. In total, over 4,5 million samples were tested. There was a significant
performance improvement provided by the framework when compared to the dynamic unpacking
solution implemented in the company’s malware scanner. On average, time was almost halved and
memory usage was reduced in most cases.
The implemented solution confirmed the advantages and pitfalls of static unpacking. The per-
formance improvement provided translates into increased user satisfaction, given the real-time,
continuous operation of an antivirus product.
Given the amount of different packer versions and families, it is clear that developing a true generic
static unpacking framework with support for all packers is a mammoth task. The modular archi-
tecture of the developed framework allows for incremental build-up of support for all the different
packers, making it a versatile tool and, perhaps, "generic".
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Resumo
Na sociedade moderna, interligada e dependente da informática, as aplicações maliciosas (mal-
ware) são uma preocupação crescente. Uma abordagem comum ao combate do malware é a sua
deteção precoce. Esta é a abordagem empregue em produtos de antivirus. Por outro lado, os au-
tores de aplicações maliciosas tentam que o seu software se mantenha oculto tanto tempo quanto
possível para atingir os seus objetivos. Uma técnica usada para evitar a deteção de malware por
produtos de antivirus é o uso de packers. A facilidade de utilização e as proteções contra deteção
e análise que os packers oferecem fizeram do empacotamento (packing) de malware uma abor-
dagem muito popular. É incontornável o facto de que a grande maioria do malware é protegido
por packers. A popularidade e complexidade diversa dos packers, desde a simples compressão até
máquinas virtuais extremamente avançadas forçou a indústria de segurança infromática a encarar
seriamente o problema. A reduzida eficácia da deteção de executáveis protegidos por packers é
um problema conhecido que a indústria tenta resolver aplicando diferentes abordagens. O de-
sempacotamento estático é uma abordagem extremamente eficiente ao problema de executávies
empacotados. Esta abordagem baseia-se em reverter as alterações feitas ao executável, sem a ex-
ecução do mesmo: desempacotamento estático. O objetivo deste projeto foi o desenvolvimento
de uma framework para o desempacotamento estático que permitisse o unpacking de executáveis
empacotados. Devido à existência de uma multitude de diferentes famílias e versões de pack-
ers, a ferramenta a desenvolver deveria permitir a inclusão incremental de suporte para diferentes
packers. A falta de informação sobre os diferentes packers obriga a que o desenvolvimento de
um unpacker (desempacotador) para um determinado packer envolva a desconstrução da sua fun-
cionalidade. Esta desconstrução foi o principal desafio deste projeto.
No decurso do projeto, foi incorporado suporte para quatro packers diferentes na ferramenta de-
senvolvida: ACProtect 1.41, ASPack 2.12, FSG 2.0, e UPX.
O objetivo final da ferramenta desenvolvida é a sua integração num scanner de malware para que
os executáveis packed possam ser unpacked antes de serem analisados. Esta intergração foi feita e
a solução implementada foi testada exaustivamente com amostras de malware identificadas como
empacotadas por assinaturas do programa PEiD. Os testes realizados revelaram que o sucesso do
desempacotamento dos diversos packers variou de 0,015% a 86%. Estas taxas de sucesso estão
intimamente ligadas à precisão das identificações feitas pelas assinaturas do programa PEiD e têm
portanto um significado relativo. No total, mais 4,5 milhões de amostras foram testadas. Houve
um aumento de desempenho no uso da ferramenta desenvolvida, quando comparado com a solução
de desempacotamento dinâmico previamente implementada no scanner de malware.
A solução implementada confirmou as vantagens e desvantages da abordágem estática ao desem-
pacotamento de executávies. Com a quantidade de differentes packers existentes, é nítido que o
desenvolvimento de uma ferramenta estática de desempacotamento de executáveuis verdadeira-
mente genérica é uma tarefa herculeana. O desenho modular da solução implementada permite
uma acumulação incremental de suporte para todos os diferentes packers, tornando a ferramenta
versátil e, possívelmente, "genérica".
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O Quinto Império
Triste de quem vive em casa,
Contente com o seu lar,
Sem que um sonho, no erguer de asa,
Faça até mais rubra a brasa
Da lareira a abandonar!
Triste de quem é feliz!
Vive porque a vida dura.
Nada na alma lhe diz
Mais que a lição da raiz-
Ter por vida a sepultura.
Eras sobre eras se somem
No tempo que em eras vem.
Ser descontente é ser homem.
Que as forças cegas se domem
Pela visão que a alma tem!
E assim, passados os quatro
Tempos do ser que sonhou,
A terra será teatro
Do dia claro, que no atro
Da erma noite começou.
Grécia, Roma, Cristandade,
Europa - os quatro se vão
Para onde vai toda idade.
Quem vem viver a verdade
Que morreu D. Sebastião?
Fernando Pessoa, in Mensagem
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the project context and motivation. The project’s goals and challenges are
briefly described. Finally, a summary of each of the following chapters is done.
1.1 Context
The project described in this document was done at IKARUS Security Software, GmbH, to be
integrated into the company’s scanning engine. IKARUS is an Austrian antivirus company with
products ranging from endpoint protection to cloud security. It has over 25 years of experience in
the IT security industry and is connected to several other IT security institutions throughout the
world sharing malware information. As an antivirus company, the analysis of malware is a key
activity of IKARUS, both for the unique identification of the malware family and the investiga-
tion of its vulnerability exploits and effects on an attacked system. The company’s approach to
malware analysis has been mostly a dynamic approach, meaning the monitoring of the execution
of the potentially malicious program and the analysis of its behaviour. This approach has many
advantages but also some disadvantages, in particular, the fact that some evasion techniques (e.g.
packing) make the analysis impossible with a purely dynamic approach. So, a decision was made
to try to complement the dynamic analysis with a static one, by which the malicious program is
not executed and its (inactive) code is searched for identification (signature matching), included
libraries and exported APIs, and deduction of general expected behaviour of the program when it
runs.
The malware problem is a growing concern in the modern, computer-dependent world. The battle
against malware involves, naturally, being able to detect it. As with any battle, in this case between
malware authors and the IT security industry, the strategies used by each side adapt and evolve
together. Because no one wants the other side to know their strategies and tools, a central activity
performed by both sides is reverse engineering. In the case of malware, the strategies used to de-
tect malware forced the malware authors to invent ways of avoiding detection. From this constant
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battle, packers emerge as a solution to evade detection. Naturally, the security industry fights back
with an array of techniques. One of these techniques is unpacking.
1.2 Project
The unpacking of executables is a technique used by the IT security industry to counter the packing
done by malware authors to evade detection. Unpacking is the reverse operation of packing. It
is taking a packed binary and restoring it to its original, unpacked, state. It is an important task
when analysing malware and can be achieved by different means: static and dynamic (see chapter
3). This project aims to create a framework for static unpacking of executables so that they can
be analysed and detected properly. The term "unpacking" might be misleading as in many cases
compression is just a small part of the result of the operations of the so called runtime packers:
deobfuscation, virtual machine code translation and decryption are quite common operations that
have to be addressed too (see chapter 3 and 4).
1.3 Motivation and Objectives
Given a program, a packer is the generic name given to programs that envelop the original pro-
gram either to reduce its size or to thwart its detection or analysis. They were first developed as
a way to save disk space when disk space was a very limited and valued resource. The found
solution was to compress the original executable and embed a routine that would uncompress it
at runtime. This compression, however, does not alter the functionality of the original program.
When loading the resulting packed program, an unpacking routine restores the original program
into memory. The fact that the packed binary looks fundamentally different than the original one
(on disk at least) was noticed by malware authors that saw in it an opportunity to evade detection.
Packers commonly employ techniques specifically aimed at avoiding detection by antivirus prod-
ucts, this makes them an important problem to address for companies in the business.
The detection of the underlying payload of packed malware is commonly done resorting to sev-
eral techniques. Static signature detection is of little use in these cases, asides from detecting the
packer that is used. Alone, static signature-based detection cannot detect the underlying malware
payload. To address this, unpacking must be done, revealing the original code as much as possi-
ble. Unpacking enables the detection to work by reversing the changes done by packers. The fact
that IKARUS has traditionally tackled the problem mostly with a dynamic approach, meant that
some of the advantages of a static approach were missing. The advantages of a static approach to
unpacking, such as performance made it very appealing for the company to pursue.
The goal of this project was to develop a generic framework for static unpacking of runtime packed
executables used by malware. Given the continuous appearance of new packers and variations
within families of packers, the produced framework should be implemented in a modular way,
allowing for the incremental addition of support for different packers. The purpose of this frame-
work is to be integrated into the company’s scanning engine to allow for static unpacking.
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In order to add support for a packer in the framework, an unpacker must be developed for it. In
most of the cases this means reverse-engineering the packer (see chapter 4). The first packers to
be supported by the tool described were selected based on statistical usage information collected
from the company’s malware database. This is to say that the order in which the packers should
be integrated in the tool must be dictated by their "popularity" of malicious usage.
1.4 Document Structure
Asides from this introductory chapter, this document contains 5 more chapters. Chapter 2 explains
the concepts involved in this project. In chapter 3, a description of the challenges facing the project
can be found. Some related work is discussed and the project is defined in detail. Chapter 4
contains a detailed description of the implemented solution as well as the methodology applied.
In this chapter, a detailed analysis for each of the packers supported by the developed framework
is also done. In chapter 5, the integration of the framework in the company’s scanning engine is
described. The testing environment is explained and the results from these tests are discussed and
analysed. Finally, in chapter 6, an analysis is done to the success of the project and further work
considered.
3
Introduction
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Chapter 2
Fundamental Concepts
This chapter introduces and briefly explains the concepts involved in the domain of this project.
These explanations are a collection of information from different sources and intend to introduce
the reader to the concepts needed to fully understand the problem. For further reading, please refer
to: [Cora, Pie02a, Pie02b, Ost02, Gop06, NHS, Kat, Fur, RSI12a, RSI12b, SH12, Eil05, Revb].
2.1 Malware
The word malware comes from the combination of the two words malicious and software. This
type of software has a malicious objective such as performing operations without the owner’s
consent[Böh08].
2.1.1 Malware Analysis
When a new malicious program is discovered, it is analysed to identify its objective, the systems
it exploits and how, and to extract different features that uniquely identify it. Knowing the sys-
tems malware exploits and how it achieves that is important information so that software vendors
are able to correct those vulnerabilities. The mapping of the features that identify the malicious
program serves the purpose of detecting it and possibly prevent its consequences if action is taken
quickly enough.
In this field, there are two kinds of analysis, static and dynamic, which will be discussed here.
2.1.1.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis is usually the first step when analysing a piece of malware. It is all the analysis
that does not run the malicious program. It includes identification of the malware with file hashes,
string search (within the program), file header analysis, among others. Disassembly of malware
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without running it is also a static analysis technique that can give analysts an in-depth view of the
program functionality. This approach has of course its drawbacks, the main one being the time it
takes to manually scan through a program’s instructions and infer about its functionality and the
vulnerabilities it exploits.
2.1.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is usually the second step in the analysis, when a static analysis has reached
a dead-end. It encompasses every analysis that is done after launching the malware. Mostly it
consists in monitoring the execution of the program and analysing its behaviour. This behavioural
analysis is another component of malware detection, as specific behaviours can identify the mal-
ware in question. This analysis usually employs a set of tools such as debuggers and virtual-
machines. There is an obvious big drawback to this approach: the malware is executed and there-
fore compromises the security of the system it is being analysed in. The use of virtual-machines
is an attempt to overcome this issue by only compromising the virtual-machine, keeping the host
safe.
It is easy to understand that not running the malware is a good thing. Especially if we do not know
what are its objectives, behaviour and effects on a system. This simple observation makes the
static analysis much more appealing. In a perfect world, this is true. However, in the real world,
we must deal with budgets and time constraints and the time it takes to dissect a complex mal-
ware purely using static analysis is just impractical. Therefore a combination of the two different
approaches is regularly used to analyse malware.
2.1.2 Malware Detection
Detectors, generically called antivirus software are used to protect systems against malware. An-
tivirus software employs different techniques to identify a malicious program from signature iden-
tification to behavioural analysis. Of course the analysis, whatever it might be, will always take
some time and resources. Therefore, a play between the deepness of the analysis and reasonable
time and resource constraints is done. The operation of this kind of software follows two ap-
proaches: on-demand and real-time scanning and protection. This means that on an on-demand
operation the software may enjoy more relaxed constraints of time and resources and therefore
perform a deeper analysis than when operating in real-time. However, in real-time, is should not
slow down "too much" the system it is protecting.
In order to detect malware, several different techniques are used. They span from simple hashes
over a file to complex heuristic approaches. The first approach to malware detection is signature-
based or pattern-based detection. In this approach, a signature is a fingerprint that identifies the
malware file or several files from a malware family. It has the obvious drawback of only being
useful for known malware (or relatives, i.e. software with shared features). This approach is very
efficient in terms of time and resources usage and is therefore popular amongst antivirus vendors
that usually combine it with other detection solutions. The simplest way to uniquely identify a
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file that has been classified as malware is by the file hash. Hashes of known malware files can
be stored and used to compare with files a detector is faced with. This approach is naturally very
flawed. A simple bit change in the file, change that might not affect it in any way, makes a file hash
different than the original one. Given this limitation, antivirus products rely on feature detection.
These features can be many things, but ideally describe the malicious parts of a file that are unique
in the way that they clearly have malicious intention. The simplest detections can be bit patterns or
bit regular expressions, other more complex ones might be the way the execution of a file behaves.
Given the sheer amount of malware circulating and new malware created every day it is not always
possible to extract features that represent a malicious action accurately. Therefore, features that
are shared between similar malware files are commonly selected. This feature selection must take
into that the selected features should not occur in "normal", benign files. This is a hard problem to
solve. Malware analysts usually describe a "good" feature as one able to identify many malware
samples and no normal files. Naturally, in order to identify many different files, a feature must be
small enough to tolerate changes around its definition. Of course the smaller the feature, the more
files will be detected with it, making small features particularly prone to false positives. Because
of all of this, malware detection is a constant adjustment of balance between identifying as many
malicious files as possible and excluding benign ones.
Since the features extracted from static analysis are limited and do not fully describe the exe-
cutable’s behaviour, simulation or emulation are commonly applied. This approach allows the
files to be executed in a controlled environment and all its behaviour analysed and logged. There
are, however, many problems with these simulations. Let us consider Windows PE executables.
In order to properly implement an environment in which these samples can execute, all the de-
pendencies for the sample must be met. This means implementing all the APIs the sample uses
as well as all the data structures on which it depends. This is an extremely laborious and deli-
cate task. The alternative is to use a sandbox, a modified Windows environment which allows the
interception and analysis of all the activity within it. All dynamic approaches have to address a
fundamental problem: when to stop. This is not trivial. Naturally, any kind of simulation will
incur in a significant performance penalty. All the dependencies that must be implemented in it
will consume significant amounts of memory, and translating instructions will also contribute to a
time penalty.
In Figure 2.1 we can see the typical malware analysis and detection process from an antivirus
company’s point of view, when a new sample is obtained. The whole process is automated because
of the amount of malware generated on a daily basis. Naturally, we start by obtaining the new mal-
ware sample. There are many ways to do this, but this is out of the scope of this document. Having
the malware sample, a series of analysis processes are performed on it. These processes extract as
much features as possible. Starting from the file hash, all possible features are statically extracted
from the file. After that, the file is executed in a controlled environment and all its behavioural
features are extracted: API calls, memory layout, etc. All extracted features are stored. These
features are then refined by going through a control group, which is a set of benign files. Refining
the features allows them to be less prone to false-positives. Finally, these features are added to the
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Figure 2.1: Typical malware workflow
"signature database" that is periodically pushed to antivirus clients.
Given a file and a signature database, an antivirus client usually performs the same process de-
scribed, with the added task of trying to match the extracted features to the ones present in the
signature database. Of course, because of time and resources constraints, this analysis might be
less thorough in real-time than on-demand scanning.
Malware authors are naturally aware of the efforts of antivirus and security companies to detect
their programs and prevent their effectiveness. So, they solve this problem using an array of tech-
niques to thwart detection. They aim their efforts to evade detection at all the phases of the analysis
and detection process. A very common approach is to try to evade static signature detection. A
way to evade pattern detection is to use self modifying code. This approach converts the original
code into some other representation and is converted back into runnable code at runtime. This
approach can have many levels of complexity from simple code conversion where the intermedi-
ate representation is constant to metamorphic code where the intermediate representation changes
with every new build of the file. Metamorphic code makes it extremely hard to detect malware
using only signature-based detection since every version of the malware is fundamentally differ-
ent. It is however not immune to behavioural heuristic detection, since its behaviour stays intact.
Another way to try to avoid detection is to buy time, making the feature extraction and analysis
as hard as possible by employing anti-reversing and anti-analysis techniques. These are discussed
in more detail in section 2.4. All these evasion techniques are employed in packers. These are
discussed in chapter 3.
2.2 The PE Format
The Portable Executable (PE) Format is a file format for executables used in Microsoft Windows
OS’s[Corb]. Portable because it was designed to be compatible with all versions of Windows and
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all supported CPUs. It is derived from the earlier Common Object File Format (COFF)[Cora]
from the OpenVMS [Com] server OS in the beginning of the 1990’s. Although it can be used with
different purposes, this format is exactly the same for both the cases of stand-alone executables
(.EXE) and dynamic libraries (.DLL). Only a bit in the PE Header indicates if the file should be
used as an EXE or a DLL. Furthermore, the file extension has absolutely no impact on the file’s
behaviour. Common extensions for the PE format are .cpl, .exe, .dll, .ocx, .sys, and more.
Although the PE format can be used for several different CPU architectures, we will be focusing
solely on the common 32bit type, since most packers only support these.
DOS ‘MZ’ Header
DOS Stub
PE Header
Section Table
Section 1
...
Section n
Overlay
Figure 2.2: Typical PE Layout
The typical layout of a PE file is shown in Figure 2.2, being the top the beginning of the file.
One of the interesting characteristics of the PE format is that the data structures in the PE file
on-disk are exactly the same as in memory at the beginning of execution. This means that if we
need to find some data on the PE file, we can do it with the file on-disk, with no need to load it in
memory. This also means that loading a PE is simply a matter of mapping certain regions of the
file into memory. However, loading is not simply mapping the file into memory. The offsets and
locations of a loaded PE may, and nearly always do, differ from the file on-disk. An explanation
of the loading process is done below in section 2.2.10. PE files loaded by the Windows loader in
memory are called modules. The address at which the module is loaded, that is, the address of
the first BYTE of the module is called the HMODULE. A module contains all the code, data and
resources needed by a process to run.
An explanation of the PE format and relevant related concepts is done in the following subsections.
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2.2.1 DOS Header and Stub
Every PE file starts with a small MS-DOS[Corc] executable, composed by the DOS ’MZ’ header
and the DOS Stub shown in Figure 2.2. This is to allow the file to be executed in MS-DOS. The
small program prints out something like "This program cannot be run in DOS mode." and closes
gracefully. In the header of this small executable we have a structure called IMAGE_DOS_HEADER.
Of interest from this structure, are the fields e_magic and e_lfanew. The e_lfanew field contains
the offset of the new PE header within the file. This PE header is the one that is in fact important
for the executable to be run in Windows environments. The e_magic field needs to have the first
two bytes set to ASCII - ’MZ’, which are the initials of Mark Zbikowsky, one of the architects of
MS-DOS.
2.2.2 PE Header
This structure, officially named IMAGE_NT_HEADERS, and its substructures store all the infor-
mation needed by the Windows loader to load and run the module.
typedef struct _IMAGE_NT_HEADERS {
DWORD Signature;
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER FileHeader;
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER OptionalHeader;
} IMAGE_NT_HEADERS, *PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS;
A PE file must have the signature value of ASCII ’PE00’ to be valid. The following two structures,
FileHeader and OptionalHeader store the actual information. Despite the name OptionalHeader,
it is required for a PE to be loaded and run.
typedef struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER {
WORD Machine;
WORD NumberOfSections; // Number of sections in file
DWORD TimeDateStamp;
DWORD PointerToSymbolTable;
DWORD NumberOfSymbols;
WORD SizeOfOptionalHeader;
WORD Characteristics; // File characteristics
} IMAGE_FILE_HEADER, *PIMAGE_FILE_HEADER;
From the IMAGE_FILE_HEADER structure, NumberOfSections, SizeOfOptionalHeader andChar-
acteristics are of particular interest for the problem at hand.
• The NumberOfSections field is self-explanatory and has the number of sections present in
the PE file.
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• The SizeOfOptionalHeader stores the size of the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure
and is essential for correct parsing of this structure.
• The Characteristics field stores flags about the behaviour of the PE file. This is, for instance,
if it is a DLL or not.
typedef struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER {
WORD Magic;
BYTE MajorLinkerVersion;
BYTE MinorLinkerVersion;
DWORD SizeOfCode;
DWORD SizeOfInitializedData;
DWORD SizeOfUninitializedData;
DWORD AddressOfEntryPoint; // RVA of entry point of program
DWORD BaseOfCode;
DWORD BaseOfData;
DWORD ImageBase; // Preferred load address
DWORD SectionAlignment; // Section alignment in-memory
DWORD FileAlignment; // Section alignment in file on disk
WORD MajorOperatingSystemVersion;
WORD MinorOperatingSystemVersion;
WORD MajorImageVersion;
WORD MinorImageVersion;
WORD MajorSubsystemVersion;
WORD MinorSubsystemVersion;
DWORD Win32VersionValue;
DWORD SizeOfImage; // Size of image in-memory
DWORD SizeOfHeaders;
DWORD CheckSum;
WORD Subsystem;
WORD DllCharacteristics;
DWORD SizeOfStackReserve; // Used in loading for stack
allocation
DWORD SizeOfStackCommit; // Used in loading for stack
allocation
DWORD SizeOfHeapReserve; // Used in loading for heap
allocation
DWORD SizeOfHeapCommit; // Used in loading for heap
allocation
DWORD LoaderFlags;
DWORD NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY DataDirectory[IMAGE_NUMBEROF_DIRECTORY_ENTRIES];
// Data directories RVAs and sizes
} IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER, *PIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER;
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Looking at the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure, we can see that it is here that most of the
information for the loading is present. The fields and structures of particular interest are the ones
that have comments.
• AddressOfEntryPoint stores the Relative Virtual Address (RVA) of the entry point of the
program. When packing an executable, packers always change this value.
• ImageBase is the preferred load address of the PE file. The loader tries to load the module
in this address. If it is not free, it will be loaded elsewhere.
• SectionAlignment is a value to which the sections should be aligned in-memory. This will
be explained in detail later in 2.2.6 Sections.
• FileAlignment is a value to which the sections are aligned to on the file on disk. This will be
explained in detail later in 2.2.6 Sections.
• SizeOfImage is the size the PE file should take in-memory when loaded. The loader uses
this value to allocate memory for loading.
• The DataDirectory is an array that is the address book of all the important locations within
the executable. Data structures such as imports, exports, resources and base relocations are
some examples of data stored at these locations. Each element of the array contains the RVA
and the size of a data directory.
2.2.3 PE Section Table
Immediately after the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS, we find the section table. This table is an array
of IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER structures. The number of elements of this array is given by the
NumberOfSections field in the IMAGE_FILE_HEADER structure.
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {
BYTE Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME]; //section name, 8 bytes long
union {
DWORD PhysicalAddress;
DWORD VirtualSize; //virtual size of the section
} Misc;
DWORD VirtualAddress; //RVA of section start
DWORD SizeOfRawData; //size of section on-disk
DWORD PointerToRawData; //FO of section on-disk
DWORD PointerToRelocations;
DWORD PointerToLinenumbers;
WORD NumberOfRelocations;
WORD NumberOfLinenumbers;
DWORD Characteristics; //flags indicating characteristics
} IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER, *PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER;
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The IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER structure stores all the information about a section. Com-
mented in the structure declaration above are the most relevant fields.
• The Name field is a human-readabale 8-byte long string. There is no terminating null char-
acter and the string is exactly 8 bytes long. This field is only for easy human identification
of what is contained in the section, it has no impact on loading whatsoever.
• VirtualSize is the size of the section in-memory, in bytes.
• VirtualAddress is the RVA of the section start in-memory.
• SizeOfRawData is the size of the section on-disk, in bytes.
• PointerToRawData is the FO (File Offset) of the section start, on disk.
• The Characteristics field is a set of flags that determine the characteristics of the section. It
includes information about what is included in the section (code, initialized data, uninitial-
ized data, etc.) and what should be the memory flag of the section in-memory (read-only,
read-write, executable, etc.).
2.2.4 Dynamic Link Library
Dynamic Link Libraries, DLLs, are essentially PE executables. They provide a mechanism by
which a program can use shared data and code. They are files separated from a calling program
that are loaded (see section 2.2.10 for a more detail description on loading) at runtime in order
for the program to use it. DLLs have explicitly exported functions and internal functions. The
exported functions can be accessed and used by other executables, may they be programs or DLLs,
but the internal functions can only be used from within the DLL. Functions can be exported by
name or by ordinal number. The ordinal number is a WORD sized number uniquely identifying a
function within a DLL. When functions are exported by name, it is the function name that uniquely
identifies it. When an executable is loaded the needed DLLs that are not loaded yet are loaded into
the process’s address space, essentially including it in the calling executable. Suppose we have
written a program that uses an exported function from an external DLL specified below:
God* getCurrentPope();
By using this function in our program, we assume it always returns the current Pope. For this to
work properly, when the Pope changes, the function must also change the Pope it returns. The
developers maintaining the DLL that exports this function can release another version of the DLL,
with the updated function, and our program will still work properly with no need to rebuild it. The
Windows loader will load the new DLL just as it did the old one and the program will call the
function as it did before.
The Windows API is implemented in several DLLs that can be used by programs to interact with
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the system. These DLLs are different in different versions of Windows. Exported functions might
be added, but Microsoft keeps previous exported functions for backward compatibility. However,
ordinal numbers can vary from one DLL version to another, making importing by name safer.
With this arrangement, programs that were designed with one version of DLL should always
work with newer versions of the DLL. However, sometimes, bug-fixes and other updates that
fundamentally change the behaviour of an API call that a program was expecting might cause the
program not to run properly with newer versions of the DLL. Most of the Windows API DLLs
are loaded differently than user DLLs, they are loaded at boot time, most of them in Kernel space,
and are readily available for referencing by user executables. This arrangement allows for reduced
memory usage since the functionality of a single mapped DLL can be accessed and its contents
executed or read by multiple applications, only when memory writes are necessary in the DLL,
are those memory pages copied to the process address space.
2.2.5 PE Data Pointers
When dealing with PE files, pointers to data within or outside the PE can be found in three dif-
ferent flavours: Virtual Address, Relative Virtual Address and File Offset (or Raw Offset). In the
executable, many locations in-memory must be specified so that when it runs it knows where to
find the required data, for example functions and global variables. However, many on-disk loca-
tions must also be specified for the loading process and for providing information about the PE.
When parsing and navigating a PE file, we must be fully aware of which kind of pointer we are
dealing with and treat it accordingly.
• Virtual Address - VA is the in-memory address, the address within the module, when the
PE is loaded.
• Relative Virtual Address - RVA is the virtual address but being zero the beginning of the
module, the HMODULE. RVA = VA - HMODULE. This value is independent of where the
module is loaded and is, therefore, generic since we need only to add the HMODULE to get
the VA and access the memory location.
• File or Raw Offset - FO or RO is as the name suggests, the offset within the file on-disk.
2.2.6 PE Sections
As seen before, the information about each section present in the PE file are specified in the section
headers array. A section of a PE represents code or data (or both) of some sort. While code is
just runnable code, data can be of many types. It can be read-write program data, such as global
variables, API import tables, resources, relocation information, etc. A section has some specified
in-memory attributes so that these can be set by the loader when loading. These attributes, amongst
others, can be read, write, execute, or a combination of them. Sections also have names that, as
stated before, are only intended to provide a human-readable identification of what the section
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contains. However, this name can be manipulated and can be essentially anything, provided it
is 8 bytes long, even an empty one. In most applications, we would be able to see a ".text"
or "CODE" named section that usually contain executable code. When dealing with malware
however, we are often faced with manipulation of section names and other section header data that
are intended to thwart analysis. Compilers usually have a standard set of sections they generate.
The Microsoft compiler, for example, prefixes the section names with a dot (.) and creates at least
two sections: ".text" and ".data". In the compilation process, the compiler usually defines the
sections and places them in the generated .obj files. The linker then takes all the .obj files together
with any included static libraries and merges all the sections with the same purposes into the final
PE. Sections have two alignment values that are defined in the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
structure: SectionAlignment and FileAlignment. Sections always start at an offset that is a multiple
of the alignment, might it be in-memory or on-disk. The purpose of these alignments is to keep the
start of each section aligned with the start of an atomic block of data. Both disks and memory have
atomic blocks of data. In disks it is usually the disk sector size, in memory it is usually page size.
Since memory pages are atomic, it doesn’t matter if a data block is smaller than the page size, one
page will be assigned. The reason there are two values is that the default page size in Windows is
usually 4KB (1000h) and aligning the file to this value would waste a lot of disk space. But disks
also have atomic data blocks so the sections are usually aligned to multiples of the disk sector size
(usually 512 bytes, 200h) to optimize the reading of the section from disk when loading. The fact
that linkers can merge sections can be used to optimize memory usage when loaded since each
section uses at least one memory page.
2.2.7 Imports Section
The Imports Section, although not a section as defined above, is a data directory where informa-
tion about the imported DLLs and APIs is stored.
When code or data from another DLL is used, it is imported. When the program is compiled and
linked, the information about the DLL names and the function names used is stored in this struc-
ture. This information allows the loader to map the addresses of all the required APIs referenced
by the executable. The basis of this section is a structure called IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR.
The DataDirectory entry for imports in the OptionalHeader points to an array of these structures.
The end of the array is determined by one of these structures filled with zeroes.
In Figure 2.3 an overview of the structures that compose the imports section and their rela-
tionships can be seen. There is an IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR structure for every imported
executable, usually DLLs. For the purpose of parsing the imported APIs, the fields from this struc-
ture that are relevant are the Name1 and FirstThunk as seen in Figure 2.3. Name1 is a DWORD
with the RVA of a null-terminated string that contains the name of the imported DLL. FirstThunk
points to an array of DWORDs (terminated by a zeroed DWORD) called the Import Address Table
(from here forward called IAT). When the file lies on disk, this is one of two things: either the
ordinal number of the imported API in the DLL, or the RVA of a IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME
structure. In order to distinguish between both cases, the high bit of the DWORD is used. If it is
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Figure 2.3: Complete overview of the Imports Section
set, then the lower 31 bits are treated as an ordinal, if not, it is treated as an RVA pointing to the
referred structure. This structure is basically a WORD followed by a null-terminated string with
the name of the imported function. The WORD is used by the loader to estimate the position of
the API in the DLL and be quicker at finding it. Once an API address has been found in memory
by the loader, it is placed in the correct place of the IAT. The executable will use this table to call
the imported functions.
It can be seen in Figure 2.3 that there is yet another table with apparently the same data as
the IAT, pointed by OriginalFirstThunk. This table is the Import Name Table (INT). The only
difference between this table and the IAT is that the INT never gets overwritten. The purpose of
this table is to keep the original information about the imports when the executable has been bound
(Binding lies out of the scope of this document, refer to [Pie02b]) but the stored API addresses in
the IAT are stale and need to be fixed. Furthermore, the INT does not need to be present for the
PE to load, although without it, the PE cannot be bound.
2.2.8 Resources Section
The resources section, although usually placed in a section of its own (Microsoft compiler and
linker usually places it in a section called ".rsrc"), can be found within other sections. It is an
area in PE that stores resources such as icons, bitmaps and dialogs. Its location and size is stored
in the DataDirectory in the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER. It is organized in a way similar to a
filesystem with directory and leaf nodes. This allows objects of the same type to be put together
for better organization and faster loading.
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2.2.9 Overlay
Although not officially part of the PE format, the overlay is sometimes found in PEs. The overlay
refers to any data appended beyond the PE image, i.e. any data appended to the PE file after the
end of the last section. This information is discarded by the Windows loader when creating the
module. Common examples of overlay are certificates and debug information. It can be simply a
certificate or have several regions with different data.
2.2.10 PE Loading
The PE loading is a central part of PE behaviour. The way the PE is structured is precisely to
allow for correct loading and execution in the environments it was designed to run in. Loading is a
multiple step complex process. In the Microsoft Windows OS, there is a routine that is responsible
for loading PE files into memory and creating a process to run them. This is called the Windows
loader. It must said that the Windows loader varies slightly from one Windows version to another.
The loader starts to work when an executable is executed (eg. by double clicking it in the Windows
Dos Header
PE Header
Section Table
Section 1
...
Section n
Overlay
Dos Header
PE Header
Section Table
Section 1
...
Section n
PE File In MemoryHigher 
Offsets
Higher 
Addresses
Figure 2.4: PE Loading
Explorer). It first tries to read the DOS, PE, and Section Headers. These structures, as seen before,
contain information about how to load the PE into memory. One value found in these structures is
the preferred loading address, ImageBase. This is the address in which the loader tries to map the
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PE file into memory. Another field is the size the PE should take in memory, SizeOfImage. If the
preferred loading address is not available, either because another module is already loaded there or
because there is not enough contiguous available space to store the loaded PE, the loader chooses
another location and allocates the area for the PE. The loader then goes through all the Section
Headers and loads each section into memory in its correct place. In this section loading process,
the loader copies the section located in the file at the offset specified by PointerToRawData, with
size SizeOfRawData, into the memory location specified by HMODULE+VirtualAddress. The
loader applies padding (zeroes memory) to the difference between both values if the VirtualSize
value is larger than the value of SizeOfRawData. It then applies padding until the next address
that is a multiple of SectionAlignment. As seen before, the overlay is not loaded. It is common to
have some hardcoded virtual address (VA) within an executables’ code (for function calls, global
variable access, etc). This of course causes a problem when the PE is not loaded at its preferred
load address: the referred VAs are invalid. For this reason, once all the sections have been loaded,
if the PE was not loaded at its preferred address, the loader performs relocation fix-ups, or base
relocations (if the file supports it). The PE file has a DataSection for relocation data. This data
is basically a list of locations where VA are used in the PE. With this information, the loader can
just add the difference between the ImageBase and the HMODULE to all the VAs at the locations
pointed by the relocation data. By doing this, all the VAs are valid once again. The loader then
goes on to guarantee all the dependencies of PE. The dependencies that are specified in the imports
section are parsed and each of the DLLs that are not loaded yet are loaded using the LoadLibraryA
API from Kernel32.DLL. Then, each of the APIs imported from each of the DLLs are mapped
using the GetProcAddress API from Kernel32.DLL. If any one of the imported DLLs or APIs is
not found, the loader exits displaying an error message. If all dependencies are met, the loader
uses the information in the PE header to initialize the stack and heap for the executable. An initial
thread is created and the process is started at the entry point. From here on the loader’s job has
ended and the executable runs its code.
2.3 Reversing
Reverse engineering is the process of extracting knowledge or design blueprints from anything
man-made[Eil05]. It is usually used to obtain missing information when this information is owned
by someone who doesn’t want to share it or it may be lost or destroyed. Software reverse engi-
neering is commonly called reversing. The purpose of reversing might be to develop a competing
product or to better understand undocumented programs. The sheer complexity of present pro-
grams make it many times not worth it to reverse and implement a competing product because
it would just take too much effort, more effort than just implementing it from scratch. Reversing
requires a set of skills such as code breaking, puzzle solving, programming and logical analysis. In
IT Security, reversing is used extensively on both sides of the fence: both by malware developers
and those fighting them. It is also very popular with crackers that aim to remove from software
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copy and other protections. Malware developers extensively use reversing to locate vulnerabili-
ties in OS’s and other software that can be exploited. On the other side, developers of antivirus
products and security researchers use reversing techniques to dissect malware samples in order to
identify the vulnerabilities they exploit, their purpose, the damage they could cause, how it can be
removed, etc. In cryptography, reverse engineering has been used to try and crack the encryption,
either to test its effectiveness or to extract the data that was encrypted. Traditionally, cryptogra-
phy has been based on secrecy, where the encryption and decryption methods were only shared
between the people that were meant to communicate privately. Historically, cracking encryption
has been based on either obtaining the decryption algorithms, trying to find flaws in the algorithm
that can be exploited to extract the key or message, or trying all possible combinations in order
to get the key or message. An example of such usage of these techniques is in military history, in
which one side tries to decrypt the other side’s encrypted messages in order to get an advantage in
the battlefield.
For reversing and malware analysis, a set of tools are employed. These tools, that have different
characteristics and purposes, are explained in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Disassembly
When a program is compiled, its human-readable text representation, the source-code, is converted
into machine-readable binary code. This machine-readable binary code is just a stream of num-
bers that are interpreted by the CPU as instructions. Each platform (CPU type) has a different
instruction and register set and their mapping. The machine code has a direct human-readable
representation that is generically called assembly language.
In essence, disassembly is taking the stream of numbers and converting them into assembly lan-
guage. A disassembler must support the platform the binary it’s analysing was compiled for.
Disassemblers usually support several platforms. The core problem of disassemblers is the dis-
tinction between code and data. As far as the pure disassembly process is concerned, the function
of a disassembler is to convert binary data into the text representation of the assembly language,
and program data such as hardcoded constants is also just binary data, meaning the disassembler
will treat it as code if not properly configured. For performance reasons, compilers commonly
insert data into code sections. To try and solve this problem, disassemblers try to follow the code
flow and only mark reachable code as code, being the rest treated as raw data. This approach used
together with user intervention can properly distinguish the code from data. As will be discussed
later in section 2.4, there are a few techniques that can be employed to confuse the disassem-
bler. Because of the ability to extract some knowledge of the function and objective of a software
sample, disassembly is extensively used in malware analysis and is commonly a component of
detection.
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2.3.2 Debugging
Anyone who has done some programming has come across debugging. Debuggers are primarily
used by programmers as a tool to find and correct errors in their programs. In this scenario,
debuggers usually display the source-code, but the reality is that they are working on the low-
level assembly code and there is an additional layer that can map the execution in the low-level
code to a position in the high level source-code. These low-level workings can make debuggers
a powerful reversing tool. The ability to show a disassembled view of the running code as well
as all the context in which it is running are of particular interest to anyone attempting a reversing
task. For reversers, a good debugger should have a powerful disassembler that allows a clear view
of the code and a way to show the cross-references of where the branching instructions go and
where they can be called from. The basis of a debugger are breakpoints. There are two main
types of breakpoints: software and hardware breakpoints. Software breakpoints are instructions
introduced into the running code that transfer control to the the debugger when they execute, and
the debugger pauses execution. This allows the user to have a look at the state of the execution and
step through the instructions if needed. Hardware breakpoints are a special CPU feature that allows
the processor to pause execution and hand over control to the debugger. Hardware breakpoints are
especially useful because it is possible to set breakpoints in memory regions of interest and pause
execution when these regions are accessed (read or written). Using these breakpoints we can easily
find code sections that manipulate these memory regions. This is particularly useful when dealing
with packers as will be explained in detail in chapter 3. A view of the registers and memory is
extremely important, and a good debugger will provide some interpretation of what is stored there
(pointer or data) while still allowing a raw view of its contents. Being able to see the context of the
running process is extremely helpful when debugging. This context may be the loaded modules,
the running threads, a stack and CPU registers view for each thread, or call stacks. Due to the
powerful insight of a software sample a debugger can provide, they remain the most useful and
direct way of analysing and reversing software.
2.3.3 Decompiling
Decompiling is the software reverse engineering Holy Grail. It attempts to completely reverse the
compilation process and produce a high-level source-code-like representation of the executable
being analysed. The problem is that the compilation process removes some of the information from
the program, so, some high-level information is completely lost: structure declarations, variable
names, variable types, comments. Furthermore, compilers attempt to optimize the program as
much as possible, and in doing so, fundamentally change the order and characteristics of the
instructions. This means that although functionally correct, the binary code is extremely hard
to interpret. The fact remains that the binary code executes as expected in the CPU. The CPU,
however, does not really need to understand what it is doing. All this, means is that although
it is possible to decompile a binary, this can be done only to a certain point. The result will be
functionally identical to the original but will be inevitably a lot less readable. It must be said that
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although these considerations are true for native x86 binaries, other platform binaries such as Java
bytecodes or .NET executables retain a lot of information from the high-level source-code and are
therefore easier to decompile and obtain decent results.
2.4 Anti-Reversing
Anti-reverse-engineering, or anti-reversing, is the name given to all the techniques employed to
increase the time and level of skill required to reverse engineer a piece of software. Anti-reversing
makes a lot of sense not only to protect intellectual property but also for malware authors. In
practice, people are faced with time and budget constraints and making a piece of software much
harder to reverse might force people to give up because of these constraints. Even for the hobby
reversers that have no budget constraint, where their motivation is the drive behind the reversing,
efforts to frustrate them might result in them giving up the challenge. However, no matter how
hard you try, you cannot make an application that cannot be reversed: it still needs to run properly.
Ultimately, if it runs, it can be reversed. Another consideration to have is that all anti-reversing
techniques come at a cost, may it be in space or in time. Depending on the approach, software
protected by anti-reversing techniques will inevitably have a poorer performance than its unpro-
tected counterpart. Whether this performance penalty is acceptable or not is up to the people who
develop the application. For malware authors, it is definitely worth it, since performance has usu-
ally a lower priority than evading detection. Making security analysts take more time to identify
and analyse their software is, naturally, a high priority because that means more time in the wild
and more infections and potentially more profit. Anti-reversing is extensively used in copy pro-
tection technologies and digital rights management, for obvious reasons. In this section, some
anti-reversing techniques are briefly explained. Generally speaking, it is possible to divide anti-
reversing approaches into two categories: reducing readability or actively checking and messing
with the reversing process.
As far as reducing readability goes, the use of obfuscation and encryption is commonly applied.
Obfuscation is a technique of anti-reversing that aims to make code as unreadable as possible
for a human being, but still run correctly. A simple example of obfuscation is embedding in the
code many useless operations, causing confusion when reading. As previously stated, bytecode-
based compiled programs like Java or .NET contain a lot of symbolic information makes them
extremely easy to reverse. Due to this fact, many obfuscators have been developed for these plat-
forms in order to reduce the readability of the compiled program. Code encryption is a common
way of preventing static analysis by making the code essentially unreadable and is accomplished
by encrypting the code after compilation and embedding a decryption routine that runs before the
program itself. On the other side, there are those techniques that actively interfere with the revers-
ing process. Anti-reversing techniques have long been observed in malware and are implemented
in many packers. A few of them are described in the following sections.
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2.4.1 Anti-Disassembly
As the name suggests, anti-disassembly is a technique used to make disassembly harder. In ad-
dition to making disassembly harder and, consequently, harder for a reverser to understand, these
techniques are commonly effective against automated detection from antivirus products since these
usually rely on some disassembly techniques. Code tailored to confuse disassemblers is routinely
used by malware. The main approach at anti-disassembly is to mess with the code flow. One ex-
ample of such a technique is using calls as unconditional jumps, also called return pointer abuse,
and is achieved by calling a function that manipulates the stack and modifies the return pointer,
pointing it to the new offset, the actual target. Disassemblers cannot follow these jumps, making
them possibly mark these target regions as data. Another approach is the use of two conditional
jumps back to back, or conditional jumps with constant conditions, that force the disassembler to
disassemble an area that will not be executed. In this area, multi-byte instructions are placed to
confuse the disassembler, making the resulting disassembly wrong. A similar technique is to make
a byte part of two instructions, disassemblers cannot correctly parse it since they only allow a byte
to belong to one instruction. This is an extremely powerful technique that cannot even be solved
with human intervention. It is however hard to implement correctly.
2.4.2 Anti-Debugging
Anti-debugging is a technique used by malware and other protected software to detect when it is
under the control of a debugger or to interfere with the debugging process. Once the software
detects it is being debugged, it might alter its behaviour or terminate execution, adding to the time
and effort required to analyse it. There are many anti-debugging tricks that could fill a book, we
will be focusing only on a few common ones.
Using the Windows API and checking Windows structures can be used in many different ways to
detect the presence of a debugger. The simplest and most direct detection mechanism is calling
the IsDebuggerPresent Windows API. This is however of little effectiveness since it is very easy
to identify and bypass when debugging. It is also possible to detect a debugger by its behaviour.
As we saw in section 2.3.2, a software debugger inserts special instructions (specifically, the "int
3" instruction) in the code. An application can check its code for these instructions and determine
the presence of a debugger. Another different approach has to do with time. In the use of a
debugger, it is very common to set breakpoints and single-step over the code. This makes the
execution slower. Because of this, timing checks can be used to infer the presence of a debugger.
It is possible to measure the time taken between two key instructions, and, if it took more than
a certain threshold, it is assumed the application is being debugged. Another mechanism used
by malware to make analysis more cumbersome is exploiting the PE header. This mechanism is
very powerful in crashing many analysis tools, debuggers, disassemblers or PE explorers. The
technique relies on the fact that Microsoft does not follow the COFF specification too strictly
and performs many undocumented checks on the PE Header and file when loading it with the PE
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loader. Manipulating the PE header in specific ways can cause analysis tools to crash but still be
correctly loaded by the Windows Loader.
2.4.3 Anti-VM
Since many malware analysts use virtual machines for analysis, authors try to embed in their soft-
ware virtual machine detection mechanisms. This relies on the assumption that if it is running
in a virtual machine, it is being analysed. This is of course not always true. The use of virtual
machines has become more popular in recent years, making the anti-virtual-machine technique
potentially counter productive for malware authors by eliminating a large group of potential tar-
gets. Since historically the most popular virtual machine software was VMWare, malware tends to
try to detect its presence. The most basic detection is commonly done by looking at the data such
as manufacturer, name or serial number of the different devices such as display adapter, hard-drive
or mouse. Because these devices are emulated in software virtual machines such as VMWare they
usually have dummy names that can be identified. There are of course many other techniques for
detecting virtual machines environments; those are, however, out of the scope of this document.
2.5 Tools
A short description of the most important and relevant tools used in the project is done in the next
subsections.
2.5.1 IDA Pro
The Interactive Disassembler Professional, IDA Pro[SA], is an extremely powerful disassembler
distributed by Hex-Rays. This application supports many CPU architectures such as IA-32, IA-
64, AMD64 and many others. It also supports many executable file types from the PE and Linux
ELF to XBE, the Microsoft XBOX executable. Besides being a very powerful disassembler, it
also allows debugging with many different debuggers, local or remote. Furthermore, it is possible
to manipulate and interact with the disassembly process in very useful ways such as function
definition and naming, variable naming and insertions of comments. It has an extremely useful
feature that allows the user to visualize a graph of the code flow, with code blocks connected
by arrows that represent jumps, may they be conditional, unconditional or calls. Another neat
feature is the ability to recognize and identify external library API calls, allowing the user to
clearly see them. It also supports plugins which allow the user to develop a tool that might aid
him/her and integrate it into the application, making it even more powerful. The ability to save the
progress of an analysis to later resume it is another advantage of this program. The combination
of these features within the application makes it a favourite of many malware analysts and reverse
engineers.
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Figure 2.5: Screenshot of IDA Pro
2.5.2 Titan Engine
The TitanEngine[Reva] framework was developed at ReversingLabs as a complete framework for
unpacking. It has embedded within a debugger, a disassembler, a memory dumper, an import fixer
and a file realigner. The more than 400 functions and a well defined API allows the programmer to
use the TitanEngine for many reversing tasks, especially unpacking. It has powerful functions for
dynamic unpacking and supporting features for static unpacking. Support for both x86 and x64
PE files make it capable of creating all types of unpackers. The fact that it is open-source gives the
programmer the freedom to modify and easily integrate it into existing solutions as needed. As a
framework developed for the purpose of unpacking, it made the perfect candidate for use in this
project.
2.6 Summary
All the concepts described in this chapter will be used in one way or another throughout the
document. Armed with the knowledge about the concepts involved in this project it is possible to
grasp the challenges faced and fully understand the rest of the document.
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The Packer Problem in Detection
This chapter will explain in detail the packer problem. The impact of packers in detection and
analysis is also explained so that the considerations and implications of the problem and its solu-
tions are well understood. The project’s ultimate objective is defined and the adopted solution is
briefly described.
3.1 Packers
Runtime packers, or packers, have been around since the early computers. Given a program, a
packer is the generic name given to programs that envelop the original program either to reduce
its size or to thwart its detection or analysis. They were first developed as a way to save disk space
when disk space was a very limited and valued resource. The found solution was to compress
the original executable and embed a routine that would uncompress it at runtime. This compres-
sion, however, does not alter the functionality of the original program. When loading the resulting
packed program, an unpacking routine restores the original program into memory. The fact that
the packed binary looks fundamentally different than the original one (on disk at least) was noticed
by malware authors that saw in it an opportunity to evade detection. Although packers are used
both by malware and legitimate software, the descriptions will be focusing only on malware.
The simple concept of compression eventually evolved into encryption. Analogous to compres-
sion, the original binary can be encrypted with some key and then decrypt it at runtime. These
simple packers are commonly called cryptors. The variation of the key allowed for multiple dif-
ferent looking files from the same executable. This allowed for further evasion because even if
one file encrypted with one key got detected and blacklisted, it would still be different from its
relatives that used different encryption keys. Eventually, some anti-reverse-engineering and anti-
analysis protections were incorporated into packers. A fundamental problem remained: when the
executable is running its contents are fully exposed. To try to solve this problem, a technique
called "shifting decode frame" was developed. This implementation does not unpack the whole
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code. It only unpacks one block of code at a time and overwrites the last one after moving on to
the next. With this approach, only parts of the code are unpacked in memory at any point in time.
Eventually full-blown virtual machines appeared. In this solution, a virtual CPU is implemented
in the unpacking stub. When the code is packed it is translated into the instructions for the virtual
CPU. When executed, each instruction is executed by the virtual CPU and no understandable code
is present in memory at any point in time. Furthermore, in some implementations, the instruction
set for the virtual CPU vary even within the same packer, being almost unique to each packed
binary. Naturally, a combination of these and other techniques can be implemented in a packer.
The evolution of packers and protectors is intertwined with the evolution of malware detection.
It is the stereotypical game of cat and mouse where the security industry tries to detect and the
malware authors try to avoid detection. As the detection technologies become more effective, the
evasion techniques evolve. As these evasion techniques evolved, it ultimately became practical for
malware authors to gather them. With this gathering, the modern packer, the protector came to be.
It is simply more efficient to develop your malware without having to worry about detection and
protect it afterwards by packing it. Packers are easy to use, and the availability of many different
packers mean that exactly the same malware can be packed with many different packers obtaining
many different signatures, therefore evading signature-based detection. In many cases, a use of
several layers of packing, done with different packers in each layer or not, has been observed. By
varying the packers used and the order in which they are used, it is possible to get a significant
increase in binaries with different signatures for the same original binary.
There are many different implementations of packers. Some focus more on reducing the size of
the executable, some focus more on anti-reverse-engineering. However, they generally function
on the same basic principle: encode the original binary, store that data in the new binary and add
an unpacking stub (and point the entry point to it) that allows the original program into run. A
simple illustration of the packing and unpacking can bee seen in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Left: packing; Right: unpacking in runtime
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Although the layout in Figure 3.1 can be considered a generic representation of packers, many
different layouts are observed. However, in most of the packed binaries, the last section contains
the unpacking stub. Usually, the unpacking stub performs a series of steps that are common to
most packers. The first step is commonly a decryption of the internal data of the unpacking stub.
This is followed by the unpacking of the sections. After this, since many packers obscure the DLL
imports, the unpacking stub takes care of importing all the necessary DLLs and APIs. Finally,
the unpacking stub passes control to the original code in the original entry point (OEP). This final
step is called the OEP Jump. After this step, the original code runs normally, as it was originally
designed.
3.1.1 Packer Identification
There are several heuristics that can be applied to decide if a file is packed or not. As with
detection, the simplest way is signature-based, where the unpacking stub is analysed statically and
a signature is produced and compared with a signature database. This is very fast and effective
for known packers already in the signature database. Such an approach is used by PEiD[Sna], a
very popular analysis tool. Although this method is the best approach to correctly identify which
specific packer was used to pack a binary being analysed, it suffers from the same problems of
signature-based detection. Furthermore, many of the signatures used by PEiD are very prone to
false-positives, ultimately incorrectly identifying packers. Another more "model-based" approach
relies on the entropy analysis of a file. Here, with a trained heuristic implementation, a binary
with more entropy than a specific value is considered to be packed[LH07]. By itself, this approach
does not identify the packer used. Finally, a behaviour-based approach, therefore dynamic, looks
for tell-tale signs of the phased execution of packed binaries. Looking for the signs of the OEP
jump is one such approach.
3.2 Unpacking
Unpacking is the reverse operation of packing. It is taking a packed binary and restoring it to
its original, unpacked, state. This process can be divided into two main phases: unpacking and
rebuilding. In this context, unpacking is the extraction of the original, underlying code and data
present in a packed binary. Rebuilding is to produce a runnable binary with the code and data
obtained by unpacking. This two-phase division allows for an unpacking solution to be tailored to
the specific needs of each situation. As far as detection of payload goes, the rebuilding phase is up
to some point unnecessary. In the context of this project, these two phases were treated separately.
Rebuilding the executable can be problematic. There are many challenges to rebuilding a working
unpacked executable from a packed binary. Furthermore, depending on the packer used, it might
not be possible to perfectly restore the original, unpacked binary. This might be, for example,
because at the time of packing, some sections of code were replaced or redirected. This kind of
fundamental change to the code makes it impossible to revert to the original state. Another issue
when rebuilding is the import resolution. Many packers obscure the imports of the packed binary
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to try to obscure the packed executable’s behaviour. This means that the unpacking stub imports
the dependencies itself. In order to rebuild a working executable, these imports must be extracted
and patched into the unpacked file in the proper format. There are also the obvious fixes that must
be done to the executable header to accommodate the changes that the unpacking procedure made.
3.2.1 Unpacking in Perspective
The ultimate objective of an antivirus company’s products is to protect a system against malware.
This is traditionally done by detection and containment. Due to the fact the the most used operating
system remains Microsoft Windows, it is natural that most of the malware is targeted at systems
with this OS. This means that vast amounts of malware are of the PE file format (see section 2.2).
As described in chapter 2, the detection of malware is faced with many challenges. One of these
challenges is the use of packers. The detection of the underlying payload of packed malware is
commonly done resorting to several techniques. Static signature detection is of little use in these
cases, asides from detecting the packer that is used. Alone, static signature-based detection cannot
detect the underlying malware payload. To address this, unpacking must be done, revealing the
original code as much as possible.
3.2.2 Dynamic Unpacking
For dynamic unpacking, simulation or emulation is commonly applied. This approach allows the
files to be executed in a controlled environment. Because the first stage of packers is to unpack
the underlying payload, allowing it to execute will allow it to unpack itself. Once the sample is
unpacked, it is possible to take a snapshot of the module and scan for signatures on the unpacked
code. These dynamic approaches have to address a fundamental problem: when to stop. In the
case of unpacking, it should stop when the execution is passed to the original unpacked code: the
OEP jump. Detecting when this happens is a hard problem and has been addressed in research
(see sections 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2, 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4). Another problem is getting past anti-analysis
techniques. A simple loop long enough to outlast the simulation will result in an analysis on a
still packed module. There are many ways of a sample detecting if it is being run in an emulator,
sandbox, or VM. As usual, these techniques are effective up to the point when they are detected
by the simulation environment developers that try to circumvent them. Even ignoring the fact
that it is possible to detect the simulation environment, the issue of performance remains. An
advantage of this approach is the fact that the packer used is of no concern, allowing it to deal with
unknown packers and making it generic. However, this solution does not work for all packers. As
discussed in section 3.1, there are packers that never fully unpack the code making this approach
insufficient. That, together with a detection that evaluates if a binary is packed or not can allow the
simulation only to be run when an executable is packed, minimizing the time and memory penalty
in global operation. As discussed in section 3.1.1, the detection of a packed binary can be made
with different approaches. From signature-based identification to randomness or entropy analysis
of the binary.
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In the next few paragraphs, some attempts at dynamic, automatic, generic unpacking solutions
are analysed.
3.2.2.1 PolyUnpack: Automating the Hidden-Code Extraction of Unpack-Executing Mal-
ware [RHD+06]
This unpacking solution presents a model that uses both dynamic and static approaches to unpack
malware. The model relies on a primary static analysis of the packed binary. This extracts the
visible code of the unpacker stub. It then runs the malware in an emulator and at each instruction
compares the code in memory with the code obtained from the static analysis. This comparison
is done after each instruction is executed to assert if any new code is present in memory. If new
code is detected, it is assumed it is unpacked code. This hybrid combination avoids the heavy
maintenance required with a purely static approach but, as discussed before, cannot unpack the
more complex packers. As an unpacker, it does not evaluate if the code is malicious or not. At
the time of its development, the most similar approach was the plugin for IDA Pro[SA] called
Universal PE Unpacker. Because this approach runs instruction by instruction, it is slow. The
tests performed took an average of just under 20 minutes to unpack. There is also the possibility
of analysing non-code regions. Due to the dynamic component of the solution, it is vulnerable to
anti-debugging and anti-emulation techniques.
3.2.2.2 Renovo: A Hidden Code Extractor for Packed Executables [KPY07]
This solution comes after PolyUnpack and tried to address some of the issues that unpacker had.
It is a fully dynamic approach that monitors memory writes. It runs the malware in an emulated
environment. It is built on top of a TEMU[SBY+08], a dynamic analysis component of BitBlaze
which is a binary analysis tool. It monitors the execution of the program and looks for a tail jump
that might indicate the end of the unpacking stub. To complement this detection technique, it
marks all written memory pages as dirty and monitors them for execution. Once one is executed,
this might mean the unpacking stub has ended and the execution has begun on the unpacked
code. This approach can penetrate into several layers of packing by recursively going through the
program. It uses a defined time-out to stop this recursion since the last layer cannot be decided.
Like PolyUnpack, it operates after every instruction, being therefore relatively slow. But due to the
fact that is does not need to compare code at each iteration, it needs only to see where the program
counter points to and if it is a dirty position, making it faster than PolyUnpack[RHD+06].
3.2.2.3 OmniUnpack: Fast, Generic, and Safe Unpacking of Malware [MCJ07]
This solution is, a purely dynamic one. Unlike other solutions before it, it is attached to an
anti-virus engine, ClamAV[Inc], to detect if the packed payload is malware. It is based on
OllyBone[Ste] which is a plugin for the debugger OllyDbg[Yus]. It uses the technique of track-
ing memory writes and monitoring if they are executed to find the end of the unpacking phase.
Furthermore, to detect the end of all the unpacking layers, it monitors dangerous system calls like
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creation or setting of registry keys. This is based on the assumption that the unpacking stub only
loads the packed code into memory and link the required libraries. This is a good assumption since
a packer does not affect the system, it merely unpacks a code that might. It is implemented as a
kernel driver for Microsoft Windows XP, which is more resilient to anti-debugging techniques.
Once the code is unpacked, it is fed to the ClamAV anti-virus software for analysis. Another
difference from other related systems such as Renovo[KPY07] is the granularity at which the ex-
ecution is tracked: at the memory-page level. This makes the tracking much faster. The solution
also employs a technique to try to figure out if the malware is packed or not based on the simple
premise: if there are no memory-pages written and then executed, it is not packed. Tests showed
that it performed faster and with better results than PolyUnpack[RHD+06].
3.2.2.4 A Study of the Packer Problem and Its Solutions [GFC08]
This very complete study done by Symantec Research Laboratories, not only overviews the packer
problem but also proposes a solution. It discusses the problems and challenges posed by packers
to anti-virus engine detection mechanisms which have been presented in chapter 1. It talks about
a tool Symantec uses called SymPac which is exactly what project outlined in this report aims to
achieve as will be seen in the next chapter. (The fact that Symantec already possesses this tool
shifts the aim of this study in a more dynamic approach.) The study defines some traits an un-
packer should have. An unpacker should be: (1) Effective: able to restore the original form of
the binary before packing; (2) Generic: cover as many packers and binaries as possible; (3) Safe:
not leave any undesired side-effects on the system it operates in; (4) Portable: run on multiple
operative systems. It talks about the different advantages and disadvantages of the different ap-
proaches to detection and unpacking of packed binaries. They propose and implement a solution
called Justin (Just-In-Time AV scanning), a purely dynamic approach. This solution implements
the same memory-page tracking mechanism as OmniUnpack[MCJ07]. It implements a couple
more detection mechanisms such as checking the stack pointer’s position (if it is in the same point
of the start of the run). It also avoids tracking memory-pages that might contain unpacker stub
code. Another technique used is to check if the command line arguments supplied with the packed
binary’s execution are moved to the stack. The combination of these techniques makes the detec-
tion of the end of the unpacking phase more precise.
Malware detection has to be automatic, with virtually no human intervention, the sheer num-
ber of malware circulating and the number of entry points to a system leaves no other option. It
is obvious that a dynamic approach to unpacking with human intervention to identify the OEP
jump allows for an effective unpacking strategy. For detection however, this strategy cannot be
applied and automated approaches for OEP jump detection have their limitations. Time and space
constraints of the malware detection itself make the use of signature-based detection extremely
appealing due to the very good speed and time efficiencies. These considerations and the issue of
anti-simulation make static unpacking a promising approach.
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3.2.3 Static Unpacking
Static unpacking is the unpacking of an executable without running it. This means a procedure
must be applied to the binary in order to unpack it. These procedures can be implemented in a
very efficient way by removing all the superfluous operations not related to the unpacking of the
binary itself. These superfluous operations can be all the anti-analysis implemented by the packer,
the decryption of the unpacking procedure itself, or anything else that is not strictly necessary for
the extraction of the unpacked code and data. Because of this, once implemented, static unpackers
are usually the fastest way of unpacking a binary. This a big advantage when it comes to real-time
detection. An obvious problem with this approach is the fact that a static unpacker only works for
the packer it was designed for. Luckily, there are many known packers that are commonly used
by malware authors to protect their payload. In the context of the antivirus industry, the project’s
goal was to develop a generic unpacking framework for runtime packers, used by malicious soft-
ware. Given the continuous appearance of new packers and variations within families of packers,
the produced framework should be implemented in a modular way, allowing for the incremental
addition of support for different packers. This allows the framework to be generic to some extent.
The framework should allow the pure unpacking of a binary as well as its full reconstruction. Fo-
cusing on the unpacking itself, a static unpacker can be developed from two different approaches.
Either by reversing the unpacking stub and implementing a functionally equivalent procedure, or
obtaining the packing procedure and devise a procedure to run it in reverse. Regardless of the
approach, the unpacking phase follows a generic process described in section 3.1. The problem
was addressed by clearly dividing the two phases: unpacking and rebuilding. The adopted solution
was to have a framework that only unpacked the binary, feeding this data to another framework
that rebuilds the executable. This approach allows the extraction of unpacked data as needed:
if no runnable executable is needed, the data obtained from the first framework is enough. The
implementation of the solution is described in detail in chapter 4.
3.3 Conclusions
It is clear that malware detection must address the packer problem. Given the many approaches
to unpacking described in this chapter, it is obvious that no one solution is the silver bullet. They
all have their advantages and pitfalls. Considering the project’s goals, static unpacking was the
solution to pursue.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter describes the implementation of the solution for the unpacking framework in detail.
It presents the general architecture of the solution and the work process design and application. A
description of development process of each unpacker and its integration in the framework is done
in depth.
4.1 Framework Design
Taking into account the goals of the project, the developed framework should be implemented in a
modular way in order to accommodate the introduction of new packers. With this in mind, and the
fact that the purpose of the unpacking framework is to be integrated into the company’s products,
the use of third-party libraries is undesirable. Given the workings of the company’s scanning en-
gine, the framework should be able to, given a file, unpack it into memory and return a pointer to
the buffer with the unpacked file. However, to rebuild the executable, the use of TitanEngine[Reva]
is employed. To solve this issue, a decision was made to divide the framework into two libraries:
one for the unpacking itself and one for rebuilding the executable. These libraries were called
unpacklib and unpackrebuildlib, respectively. With this separation, it is still possible to take ad-
vantage of the unpacking in the company’s products and use the rebuilding internally for malware
analysis. In order to allow for the modularity needed, a class inheritance architecture was adopted.
This allowed the methods and data used by all unpackers to be implemented in the base class and
re-implemented in derived classes only if needed. This architecture was adopted for both libraries.
A data flow was defined between for the global solution.
In order to test the development, a unit testing application was implemented. This application
compares the outputs of unpacklib and unpackrebuildlib to data known to be correct. It also
automatically generates this comparison data for the first time an unpacker is implemented.
In figure 4.1 the data flow between the different components involved in the solution can be
seen.
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Figure 4.1: General overview of the whole solution
Figure 4.2: Architecture of unpacklib
In figure 4.2 the general architecture of unpacklib is shown. All the gathered information
about the file (such as the OEP and IAT addresses, sections information, etc.) is stored in the
base class. This information is essential not only for the rebuilding process but also for analysis.
Comparatively, the architecture of unpackrebuildlib is shown in figure 4.3. These figures show
the implementation of the four unpackers developed in the duration of this project. Subsequent
packers can be added by implementing a class derived from the base classes and implementing the
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of unpackrebuildlib
abstract methods unpack() and unpackAndRebuild().
4.2 Methodology
In order to tackle each of the packers, a systematic approach was defined:
1. Research for anything that can be used, i.e. some unpacking code that can be adapted. If
such an open-source code can be found, jump to 7.
2. Research the packer.
3. Obtain the packer and pack a known executable: notepad.exe, calc.exe, putty.exe. If the
packer cannot be obtained, use samples in the malware database that are packed with it.
4. Analyse the structure of the file.
5. Disassemble and analyse the unpacking stub.
6. Debug the unpacking stub to get a good understanding of the unpacking procedure and
define a way to extract the code.
7. Implement unpacking in unpacklib.
8. Implement rebuilding in unpackrebuildlib.
9. Test and produce some unit tests.
The use of several different files packed with the same packer allows for the distinction be-
tween the constant and variable features of the packer.
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4.2.1 Packer Prioritizing
To choose the order by which the packers would be worked on, an analysis was made on the
statistical usage of packers in the company’s malware database. Each malware sample in the
company’s malware database has a PEiD signature associated with it. The samples were grouped
by PEiD signature for analysis. This analysis produced an ordered list of the most used packers.
The top 50 were singled out to be worked on. It must be said that in this list were also entries that
were not packers but simply compilers. These were removed. The resulting list is can be seen in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Packer Statistical Usage
Usage Packer Level Order
1 Armadillo_v1.71 0
2 UPX_V2.00-V2.90 1 2 (4.4)
3 UPX_v0.89.6_-_v1.02_/_v1.05_-_v1.22 1
4 UPX_2.90_[LZMA] 1
5 Armadillo_v1.xx_-_v2.xx 0
6 UPX_2.00-3.0X 1
7 UPX_v0.89.6_-_v1.02_/_v1.05_-v1.24 1
8 ACProtect_1.41_->_AntiCrack_Software 4 3 (4.5)
9 PolyEnE_0.01+_by_Lennart_Hedlund -
10 ASPack_v2.12_ 3 4 (4.6)
11 ASProtect_V2.X_DLL_->_Alexey_Solodovnikov 4
12 ASPack_v2.12 3
13 ACProtect_1.3x_-_1.4x_DLL_->_Risco_Software 4
14 Anti007_V1.0-V2.X_->_NsPacK_Private -
15 MaskPE_V2.0_->_yzkzero -
16 PECompact_V2.X->_Bitsum_Technologies 3
17 PeCompact_v2.08_->Bitsum_Technologies 3
18 PeCompact_2.xx_-->_BitSum_Technologies 3
19 UPX_v0.89.6_-_v1.02_/_v1.05_-_v1.22_DLL 1
20 PECompact_2.0x_Heuristic_Mode_ 3
21 Upack_v0.39_final_->_Dwing -
22 UPX_2.93_-_3.00_[LZMA] 1
23 Upack_V0.37-V0.39_->_Dwing -
24 PECompact_v2.xx 3
25 FSG_v2.0_->_bart/xt 2 1 (4.3)
26 UPX_v0.89.6_-_v1.02_/_v1.05_-v1.22_(Delphi) 1
27 Upack_V0.39-V0.399_->_Dwing -
28 tElock_0.99_-_1.0_private_->_tE! -
After some research, an evaluation was made to the most important packers. A level was
assigned to each packer according to the effort required to unpack being 5 extremely complex and
1 very simple, and finally 0, no unpacking needed. The order by which the packer support was
added is shown in column "Order".
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The fact that some packers appear several times might be due to the fact that they have different
versions or different options when packing.
It is clear that Armadillo is the most used packer. However, research showed that this specific
version of the packer was simply a wrapper with licensing and anti-analysis features. The payload
was not packed, hence the 0. Although the next most used packer was UPX, a decision was made
to begin with FSG 2.0. This would allow the author to get familiar with unpacking and reversing.
UPX would be worked on after FSG 2.0. Following UPX, unpacking ACProtect 1.41 would be
addressed. According to Table 4.1, the next packer to be tackled should be PolyEnE. However,
once briefly analysing randomly selected samples from the malware database which supposedly
packed with PolyEnE, it was found that they were in fact packed with UPack. Because of this, a
decision was made to demote this packer’s statistical significance and make the next one ASPack
2.12.
4.3 Unpacking FSG 2.0
In order to get familiar with static unpacking, the unpacking of FSG 2.0 was done. FSG stands for
Fast, Small, Good and was developed by "xtreeme team", apparently a Polish team of developers.
Its latest version is 2.0 which was the one analysed in this project. This packer presented a good
starting point because of its relative simplicity.
4.3.1 Analysis
4.3.1.1 Layout
Work started by packing notepad.exe with FSG 2.0. This packed executable was then disassembled
and thoroughly analysed.
An important information noticed early on was the fact that the executable did not present
the typical layout of a PE file, as shown in Figure 4.4. It only contained two unnamed sections
whereas the typical layout is to have three named sections: ".text", where the execution code lies;
".data", where data used by the code lies; and ".rsrc", where resources like icons and strings are
stored. It was quickly noticed that the unpacking procedure resided just after the real PE header,
although the section sizes and size of headers were manipulated to hide it.
It was also observed that the first section was collapsed: it did not take up any space on disk
but had space allocated to it in memory. Raw size = 0 and Virtual size > 0. This suggested that this
would be the section to which to unpack the data. The second section had some data but a string
search yielded little results since the only strings found were about the authors and details of the
application, metadata. No strings used in the program itself were found. This obviously suggested
that the program was packed.
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Figure 4.4: Packing and unpacking of FSG 2.0
4.3.1.2 Imports
When analysing the imported DLLs and functions, it is clear that only two functions are imported
from Kernel32.dll. These functions were LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress. This might seem
strange since Microsoft Notepad has a graphical user interface and Gdi32.dll was not imported.
However, it is a common technique to hide the program’s true imports by importing only LoadLi-
braryA and GetProcAddress since by calling these functions it is possible to import all the libraries
and functions that are needed.
4.3.1.3 Unpacking
After careful analysis of the unpacking procedure, two different phases were identified: one to
unpack and one to resolve the imports.
Unpacking data
Once the unpacking code had been correctly identified, it was necessary to determine if it was
generic, that is, if it was the same for every executable packed with FSG 2.0. This was done by
packing putty.exe and analysing it. It was concluded that it was indeed generic and that the start
state values from which it began were the only things that varied from one executable to another.
These values were stored in the packed data section. The address at which these values are stored
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could be extracted from the first instruction (file offset 154h+2) of the unpacking code, which
loaded the values into memory. This address, however, was a VA (Virtual Address), as was the
OEP address, and there was no relocation information. This meant that FSG 2.0 could not run on
systems with ASLR enabled. In Microsoft Windows ASLR came enabled by default only from
Windows Vista SP1 onwards.
Resolving imports
Once all the data finished unpacking, it is clear that all the sections present on the original
unpacked file have been merged and are now present in the first section. Analysing this section,
it is clear that the IAT is now clearly visible and the imports by name can be seen, even though
it is not according to PE COFF specification. The part of the unpacking stub that deals with the
imports mimics the PE loader in the sense that it loads the libraries and finds the offset of the
imported function and places that offset in the table for the application to use. Since the imports
are visible after unpacking, they can be extracted to build a complete import table.
OEP jump
At the end of the import resolution, the unpacking stub hands over the control to the original
application. This jump is made to an offset that is also stored in the values array in the packed
section of the file and it is therefore possible to extract.
4.3.2 Implementation
To unpack statically means the executable should not be run but another process should unpack it
by modifying its contents. To this end, an application was developed to do just that.
4.3.2.1 Unpacking
First, the executable file was loaded into a buffer in memory. Once there, the header was parsed
using a library the company possesses. The unpacking code, extracted from the disassembled
unpacking stub, was translated from x86 assembly into C code. The start state was built by parsing
the values in the file at the offsets that have been identified in analysis. The unpacking code was
executed and the data was unpacked into another buffer in memory. The next task would be to
produce an executable file of the unpacked code.
4.3.2.2 Rebuilding the executable
In order to produce an executable file, the buffer with the unpacked data would not suffice. A
header should be added that would enable the Windows loader to load the file and execute it. The
import table should also be fixed. Another consideration is that some of the resources for proper
loading of the file still remain in the packed data section, such as the author and icon information.
To aid in this task, another library was used: TitanEngine[Reva].
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Using this library, the first section of the file was inflated to its size in memory (since it was
collapsed) and the unpacked data copied into it. A parser was developed for the IAT, and the
functions provided by TitanEngine were used to build a valid import directory, according to PE
COFF specifications. A new section was added at the end of the file with the new import directory.
Through this approach, all the libraries and functions imported by the import resolution phase of
the unpacking stub were present in the new import section.
Also with the help of this library, the header was fixed to reflect the new sectional layout,
the entry point was set to the OEP, whose address had been parsed when unpacking and the IAT
address was pointed to the new correct IAT. This produced an unpacked executable file. Although
this file was unpacked and executable, it was not identical to the original file before packing, it
still contained the packed section and the section layout information from the original file had been
completely lost. This, however, is not a problem since the objective was to unpack and produce an
executable file for analysis.
4.4 Unpacking UPX
The Ultimate Packer for eXecutables, UPX is a very popular open-source packer. It has been
around since 1996. It was developed and maintained by Markus Oberhumer, László Molnár and
John F. Reiser. The fact that it supports unpacking out of the box made the unpacking of UPX
extremely simplified. The fact is, UPX is not aimed at protecting code from reverse engineering
or analysis: it is aimed at compressing executables. This is the reason it supports unpacking out of
the box and is open-source. If it was aimed at protecting against reverse engineering, this would
be counter-productive.
Adopting a pragmatic approach, no analysis of the packer was done. Work could start imme-
diately with integration of the available source-code. Starting from the source code of UPX, work
began in integrating it into unpacklib. All the code concerning packing was removed. A wrapping
interface was created to integrate the code into unpacklib.
The fact that UPX supports many different executable types, from PE’s to ELF’s, made it
possible to also integrate some unpacking capability for these different executable types and ar-
chitectures. The integration of the UPX unpacking code meant that virtually all the versions of
UPX could now be unpacked.
4.5 Unpacking ACProtect 1.41
Anti Crack Software Protector, ACProtect is a packer designed with protection in mind. Unlike
the packers previously dealt with, ACProtect 1.41 implements some anti-debugging and encryp-
tion which made the unpacking a lot more challenging. The version analysed, 1.41, is quite old,
from around 2005. At the time of writing this document, the developers’ website was no longer
operational. Information was found to be scarce and scattered. However, it was possible to de-
termine that ACProtect 1.41 is a packer very similar to ASProtect, and that the developers were
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Chinese. The protections implemented in ACProtect seem to be unceremoniously copied from
ASProtect (see section 4.6). ACProtect 1.41 has a licensing mechanism that allows developers to
issue registration keys for their software protected by ACProtect. It features public key encryption
algorithms for generation of mentioned registration keys. It can perform code replacement, where
some code of the protected application is replaced with calls to functions in the ACProtect code. It
also uses a metamorphic engine and several encryption layers, varying every time a file is packed.
It features many anti-debugging, anti-disassembly and anti-emulation techniques.
4.5.1 Analysis
4.5.1.1 Layout
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Figure 4.5: Packing and unpacking of ACProtect 1.41
Following the general procedure, work started by obtaining a copy of the packer and packing
notepad.exe. Comparing the packed and unpacked notepad executables, a notable difference can
be seen: the packed executable has one extra section, the last one, named ".perplex". This section
probably holds the unpacking stub, since the address of entry point is located within it. Other
differences are in the raw sizes of the other original sections that in some cases have shrank.
Packing of other executables with this packer did not always result in a smaller binary size due to
the appending of an extra section of considerable size in the end.
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4.5.1.2 Imports
Once again, the imports give us very little information about the packed executable. In this case
there are more explicit imports than the typical LoadLibraryA and GetProcAdddress. Some re-
search on the packer and the packing tool reveals this packer has the ability to look for an enemy
process and kill it, and, due to the licensing mechanism, it is able to display a message box when a
trial version is used. This explains the ExitProcess import from Kernel32.dll and the MessageBoxA
from User32.dll.
4.5.1.3 Unpacking
After long and careful analysis of the unpacking, several stages were identified.
Decrypt unpacker
The last section, containing the unpacking stub, proved to be encrypted. This made static anal-
ysis practically impossible. A dynamic analysis proved that not only did the stub decrypt itself
several times, it also mutated throughout execution. Because of this, it was much harder to iden-
tify the unpacking code itself, within all the modifying and stub decrypting code. Furthermore, the
decryption of the stub code varied from packed file to packed file but only in some instructions and
hardcoded values. This will be discussed in detail below. After some persistence, the unpacking
code for the sections was identified. This code proved to be the same in different packed files.
Unpack data
The unpacking is done section by section most of the times, although sometimes it can unpack
two contiguous sections at once. However, not all sections are packed and not all the data in
a section might be packed. The information about the packed sections, the beginning and size
of the packed code is stored in an array of DWORDs in the stub section. This array however,
although located at the same offset within the .perplex section in every packed file (at file offset
E836h relative to the beginning of the section) is encrypted. The decryption of this array is done at
runtime like the rest of the section, may it be code or data, and follows the same general procedure
shown in Listing 4.1. It is clear from the amount of variables and variable operations on the
DWORDs that the decryption is not straightforward. With the information of the packed sections,
the unpacking stub proceeds to unpack each of the sections by first copying the whole section into
a dynamically allocated buffer and then unpacking it directly into the section, overwriting it.
Check for debugger and licensing
Once all the sections have been unpacked, the unpacker proceeds to do an array of verifications.
These include detection of debugger or analysis through various methods, verifying the file has
not been modified by reading it and generating a hash and comparing it to the stored hash, looking
for enemy processes and killing them, etc. Some of the debugger detections were:
• IsDebuggerPresent API from Kernel32.dll
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• int 3 - instruction causes an interrupt to see if it is intercepted by a debugger
• int 1 - trap to kernel debugger
• Searching all the running processes for known debuggers and analysis tools (ollydbg, etc)
The packer also has some anti-disassembly features. Return pointer abuse and conditional
jumps back to back are extensively used (see section 2.4.1). In order to bypass all the debugger
detections the IDA Stealth[New] plugin was used and all exceptions were passed to the debugee.
If debugging or analysis is detected, the execution will end, either by intentionally crashing or
simply terminating. Assuming no debugging is detected, it then proceeds to check if the file is
licensed or in trial, if not licensed, it displays a message box saying it is a trial version.
...
mov ecx, some_value ;not really important for the purpose
;of decrypting the array
mov edi, seed_value ;unknown seed value, different for every
;packed file, calculated throughout
;the previous decrypting cycles
loop_start:
mov eax, dword_from_array[i] ;get the DWORD from the array
<op1> eax, edi ;the operation varies but is always from
;the set {sub, xor, add}
<ror/rol> eax, rot_value ;operation also varies, but not important
;since rol and ror are complementary.
;The value however is unknown and is
;different in every packed file. It
;is also calculated throughout the
;previous decrypting cycles.
<op2> eax, dword_from_array[i+1] ;gets the next DWORD from the array and
;performs once again an unknown operation
;on it from the set {sub, xor, add}
mov dword_from_array[i], eax ;puts the decrypted DWORD back in the array
<op3> edi, step_difference ;operates on the value that is used in the
;first operation, again with an unknown
;operation {sub, xor, add}
loop loop_start
...
Listing 4.1: General procedure for decryption of stub
Resolving imports
In order to resolve the imports the procedure uses another array of DWORDs (at file offset
E906h, relative to the .perplex section start) that contains the RVA of the original import directory.
This is, of course, also encrypted and is decrypted with the generic code seen before. Once it
has the decrypted RVA of the import directory it proceeds to decode the API strings that are still
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encoded, even though the section is already unpacked. This decoding is however extremely simple
and proved to be the same in every packed file. It is done byte by byte on each string by doing a
rol of 3. The operations done on each string can be seen in Listing 4.2.
...
decrypt_byte:
mov al, string[i] ;get byte
test al, al ;see if the string has ended (byte is zero, since it is a
null terminated string)
jz end_loop ;when string end, break loop
rol al, 3 ;operate on the byte
mov string[i], al ;put the byte back
jmp decrypt_byte ;continue loop
end_loop:
...
Listing 4.2: General procedure for string decoding
After all API strings are decoded, it uses GetModuleHandleA API to get the handles of the
already loaded libraries and loads the rest using LoadLibraryA, and links the APIs using GetPro-
cAddress: a typical approach. However, once each DLL is loaded, it overwrites the string with
zeros. The same is done with the APIs.
OEP jump
Once getting past the anti-debugging tricks, some more decryption is done and the OEP jump
becomes obvious, with a simple jmp instruction to the correct offset. This offset was stored,
unencrypted, at file offset 1714Bh, relative to the .perplex section.
Code replacement
If this option is checked when packing an executable, this packer replaces certain instructions
with calls to functions in the ".perplex" section that implement the same functionality, although
highly obfuscated. This of course means that the unpacked code is inevitably different than the
original code before packing.
4.5.2 Implementation
4.5.2.1 Unpacking
In order to statically unpack executables packed with ACProtect 1.41, it was necessary to address
the most obvious problem: the encrypted values. There was, however, a critical detail regarding
the layout of the arrays where the values are stored that suggested the problem could be solved:
the 10 or so DWORDs before the array were supposed to be zero after decrypting and they were
decrypted in the same loop as the values needed. As seen in Listing 4.1, to properly decrypt a
DWORD, one must know:
44
Implementation
• the DWORD to be decrypted
• the next DWORD
• y = seed_value
• z = rot_value
• a = step_difference
• α = op1
• β = op2
• γ = op3
Since the DWORD and the next DWORD are obtained directly from the array, it is only
necessary to find out the other values and operations. It is not necessary to know if the rotation is
ror or rol. It can be set to ror and just get a different value for the rot_value but still preserve the
functionality.
Let x[0] be the first DWORD in the array that holds some data to be decrypted (i.e. not 0).
With this in mind, and knowing that the DWORDs before the beginning of the array are supposed
to be 0 after decryption, it is possible to extract the following three equations:
β (ror(α(x−3,0γ(y,a)),z),x−2) = 0 (4.1)
β (ror(α(x−2,1γ(y,a)),z),x−1) = 0 (4.2)
β (ror(α(x−1,2γ(y,a)),z),x0) = 0 (4.3)
From these three equations, the following two equations were extracted:
y= α(x−3,rol(β−1(0,x−2),z)) (4.4)
a= γ(y,α(x−2,rol(β−1(0,x−1),z))) (4.5)
Since from these two equations the variables that have more different possible values (DWORDs)
are obtained, it is reasonable to find the others by brute-force: each operator only has 3 possibili-
ties and z only has 31. With this hybrid "informed-brute-force" approach it was possible to find all
the needed values and operators within a very reasonable time-frame (few ms). Once all the val-
ues and operators are defined, it is possible to decrypt the rest of the array and get the information
needed for unpacking.
Because this packer sometimes unpacks several contiguous sections at once, simply loading the
file into memory would not suffice. To address this, a simple PE loader was implemented to mimic
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the memory allocation of the Windows PE loader. With the executable "loaded" into memory, un-
packing could be done. The unpacking code was converted to C and thoroughly tested in both 32
and 64 bit architectures with the values decrypted using this approach. The resulting unpacked
sections were identical to the ones unpacked at runtime.
4.5.2.2 Rebuilding the executable
Once all the sections were unpacked, one could proceed to fix the imports. For this, as previously,
TitanEngine was used. As mentioned above, the strings with the libraries and API functions are
still encoded, so decoding must be done on the strings before. For the decoding of the strings,
the string decoding procedure described in "Resolving imports" was used. It was noticed that the
import directory was according to PE COFF specifications, and a parser was developed for it. With
this, the imports were fixed and the executable rebuilt.
There remained, however, a problem. When packing, if the user chose the code replacement
option, the resulting code, even after unpacking is inevitably different than the original one. As far
as signature identification goes, this might not be a very big problem since the replaced instructions
are sparsely spread, with many large sequences of untouched code. Execution, however, remained
an issue. This is because the code with which the instructions were replaced are calls to functions
in the stub (.perplex) section. Even if the stub section is present, it is not present in its final,
decrypted state, since no static unpacking of this section was done. A decision was made not to
pursue unpacking of the .perplex section since the original code was already unpacked and as far
as signature identification goes this was enough. Also, all the imports were now visible as well.
4.6 Unpacking ASPack 2.12
ASPack is essentially just a compressor, it has no protection or obfuscation asides from omitting
a few API imports in the packed file. It is the simplest packer/protector in a suite that includes
ASProtect and the extra protections are therefore implemented in the latter. The suite is developed
by Alexey Solodovnikov, and the products are commercially available to legitimate costumers who
want to protect their software.
Although this packer had no anti-debugging tricks, it proved a challenge because it is object
oriented, written in C++. This is a problem because when translating the code to C, all the point-
ers must be taken into account. Although this packer only supports the IA-32 architecture, the
developed unpacker should also work in 64 bit architecture.
4.6.1 Analysis
4.6.1.1 Layout
Once again, the packer was obtained and notepad.exe was packed. A comparison between the
section layout of the packed and unpacked file shows that the packed file keeps all the original
sections and adds two extra sections at the end. These sections are named ".aspack" and ".adata"
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Figure 4.6: Packing and unpacking of ASPack 2.12
and appear in that order. The last section, ".adata" is completely collapsed and has raw size of
0. This suggests the unpacking code resides in the ".aspack" section. It was also noticed that all
the original sections had different raw sizes, meaning they have all been packed or touched by the
packer in some way.
4.6.1.2 Imports
The libraries imported by the packed file are the same as the original file. However, many API
imports are missing. This suggests they are linked at runtime. The import of LoadLibraryA and
GetProcAddress also support this.
4.6.1.3 Unpacking
Unpack data
Unpacking is done section by section. The information about the address of the packed code
and its size in each section is stored in an array at offset 57Ch, relative to the beginning of the
".aspack" section, and is not encrypted. For each section, an instance of a class is created and a
buffer is allocated to which the code is copied and subsequently unpacked. The unpacking itself
is done with the aid of 9 functions, belonging to either one or two classes. These classes have
member data, some of the data are pointers to arrays or other structure types. The unpacking is
done also with two seed number arrays, one present in the ".aspack" section and another which is
dynamically allocated and calculated in runtime.
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Resolving imports
The unpacked import directory is according to PE COFF specification. The RVA of the original
import directory is located at offset 279h relative to the beginning of the ".aspack" section. The
resolving of imports is pretty straightforward. The unpacker calls GetModuleHandle with every
DLL to see if it is already loaded, if not, loads it. It links all the APIs using GetProcAddress.
OEP jump
The OEP is stored at offset 39Bh, relative to the beginning of the ".aspack" section. It is not
encrypted. A simple jmp instruction transfers the execution to it.
4.6.2 Implementation
4.6.2.1 Unpacking
After identifying and understanding all the functions used in unpacking, the translation into C
code began. In the member structures of this class, all pointers had to be singled out from the
rest of the data. This was done by carefully going through the code and seeing where an access
was attempted at an address that was stored in one of these structures. These variables were then
converted into offsets, relative to a beginning. This approach was chosen instead of changing them
to pointers because in this way one could keep the structure intact and just add the pointer to which
the offset is relative to when it would be used. Otherwise, let’s say an array of DWORDs has data
and pointers, when the pointers become QWORDs, the array is broken from that point on. All
the pointers were corrected and the information about the packed sections was parsed. With this,
the sections could be sequentially unpacked. Testing proved the static unpacked sections were
identical to the runtime unpacked ones, both in 64 and 32 bits.
4.6.2.2 Rebuilding an executable
After unpacking all the sections, TitanEngine was used to rebuild the imports. Parsing the import
table presented no problem as the layout was according to PE COFF specification and the parser
developed previously proved effective. The imports were rebuilt successfully without issue and
executable files were produced.
4.7 Conclusions
It is clear from the different packers analysed and integrated in the unpacking framework that
packers can differ greatly in their approaches. Each of the packers presented a different challenge
and the unpacking strategy had to be adapted.
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Chapter 5
Tests and Analysis
In this chapter, the integration of the framework in the company’s malware scanner is described.
The test design is explained and the results are analysed. Keeping in mind the focus of this project,
the data is analysed in the perspective of packers and unpacking.
5.1 Test Design and Implementation
In order to test the developed unpackers in real-world conditions, the framework had to be inte-
grated in the company’s malware scanner. This had already been considered in the design phase,
making integration easier.
It is clear from chapter 4 that in the developed framework the issue of packer detection and iden-
tification is not addressed. However, packer identification through PEiD signatures had already
been performed on the malware database, and that provided a good packer identification to work
with. Given the implemented unpackers, four PEiD signatures were selected for testing.
• FSG_v2.0_->_bart/xt
• UPX_V2.00-V2.90_->_Markus_Oberhumer_&_Laszlo_Molnar_&_John_Reiser
• ACProtect_1.41_->_AntiCrack_Software
• ASPack_v2.12_
Although the malware in the database had packer identification, the available version of the
scanner was not prepared to use it. To solve this, the scanner was modified and four different
scanners were built, each with support for one of the packers. In the scanning process, a step was
added in order to try to unpack a PE32 file. If unpacking was successful, scanning would be done
on the unpacked sections instead of the packed ones. This also allowed scanning not to be done
on the unpacking stub section. Although a buffer with the unpacked data was already available
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from unpacklib, some specific issues needed to be addressed in the integration with the scanner.
One of these issues is the fact that there might exist more than one section present in the unpacked
buffer. This might not seem an issue, but the reality is that sections marked as non-executable
are treated differently than sections marked as executable. This meant that the information about
the sections contained in the buffer should also be transmitted to the scanner. This information
included section offsets and sizes and whether it is executable or not.
It was assumed that the execution simulation done within the scanner was only for dynamic un-
packing. This meant that if the unpacking was successful, there was no need to run this simulation.
This assumption, although reasonable to make, is not absolutely true: in some cases, the features
extracted in the simulation are important in detection.
Malware 
sample
Extract static 
features except 
sections
unpacklib
Extract 
features from 
sections
Extract 
features from 
sections
Simulate 
execution and 
extract features
End
Failure
Success
Figure 5.1: Modified scanning process. In green is the original process.
In Figure 5.1 the change made to the scanning process can be seen. In green is the original
scanning process, in orange are the new steps added (the connection in red was removed). Having
the four different scanners, each with support for one of the packers, a testing environment was
set up. The approach adopted was to scan the malware samples identified with the PEiD signature
corresponding to the supported packer of each scanner. In order to get a basis for comparison,
these samples were also scanned with the unmodified scanner. It should be said that the scanning
performed on these samples, with all the scanner versions, was extremely thorough. For each of
the samples, features were extracted from every scanning step and detection for signatures was
performed on every one of these features. This is a different mode of operation than normal.
The common user only wants to know if a file is infected or not. This means that at the first
signature match on a feature, the scan can terminate. For testing purposes, the scanning was
performed forcibly through all the scanning stages and different feature extractions. This approach
was chosen to make sure scanning would reach the unpacking step. With this approach, naturally,
more than one signature match can be found for one particular sample.
From all the scanning performed, data about time, resources, detected signatures and success
of the unpacking step was collected. The resulting data is presented and analysed in the next
section.
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5.2 Global Results and Analysis
In Table 5.1, the results from the tests performed on each of the unpackers can be seen. As previ-
ously stated, for each of the unpackers, a set of malware samples identified by a PEiD signature
corresponding to the packer was selected. These sample sets naturally varied in number but were
all well above the hundreds of thousands, making the tests statistically significant.
In data presented in Table 5.1, the sample count is the number of malware samples with which the
unpacker was tested. The "Unpack Success Rate" represents the percentage of the samples tested
that were successfully unpacked by each of the implemented unpackers. All values asides from
the sample count and the unpack success rate only consider the successfully unpacked samples.
"Average Time" and "Average Memory" are the time taken and memory use of the new scanning
process, relative to the old, standard scanning process. The "Old Detection Rate" and "New De-
tection Rate" are the percentage of samples that get detected as malware (i.e. at least one signature
match) in the standard scanning process and the new process with static unpacking, respectively.
A graphical perspective of this data can be seen in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
Table 5.1: Global Results
FSG 2.0 UPX ACProtect 1.41 ASPack 2.12
Sample Count 258510 2466228 1169790 783149
Unpack Success Rate 86% 8% 0,015% 67%
Average Time (relative to
old scanning process)
48% 57% 59% 76%
Average Memory (rela-
tive to old scanning pro-
cess)
67% 60% 78% 109%
Old Detection Rate 96% 99,6% 99,99% 94%
New Detection Rate 87% 88% 43% 84%
The successful unpack rate of the implemented unpackers varied widely. There might be a
couple of reasons for the unpacker not being able to unpack. The first reason has to do with
false identification. The PEiD signatures used to identify files packed with the respective packers
is vulnerable to false-positives, as is any other signature for that matter. This means that the
sample set selected was not composed solely by samples packed with the intended packer. Other
files were also present, packed by other packers or simply not packed. Another reason might be
that some samples in these sample sets were indeed packed with the intended packer but with
slight changes, and the unpacking implementation is not tolerant enough to these slight variations.
Another reason might be that the unpacker crashed during unpacking. This might mean that the
sample was tailored in a specific way to try to crash analysis tools like the one developed. It might
still be packed by the intended packer but have, for example, a deliberately modified header that
crashes the tool when it tries to load the file in memory. These crashes, however, only happened
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Figure 5.2: Global success rates
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
FSG 2.0 UPX ACProtect 1.41 ASPack 2.12
Performance Comparison 
Avg New Time Avg New Memory
Figure 5.3: Global performance
in the ACProtect and in the ASPack unpackers and the crash rate was around 0,02% in both cases,
making them statistically insignificant.
The averages of time and memory are presented relative to the standard scan. Naturally, for these
values, only the samples in which static unpacking was successful are compared. In these cases, a
performance improvement was to be expected since the dynamic unpacking is not performed when
the static unpacking is successful, reinforcing the performance advantage of the static approach to
unpacking.
The old and new sample detection rates refer to the percentage of samples, from the subset of
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Figure 5.4: Global detection effectiveness
samples that were successfully unpacked, that had at least one detection (i.e. were detected as
malware in the scan). It can be seen that even in the standard, unmodified, scan there were some
samples that did not get identified as malware. In each of the cases, the rate of detection went
down. Given the fundamental changes done to the scanning process, changes in the detection
rate were expected. The loss of signature matches relative to the standard scan might be due to a
number of things. One reason is that the signatures might have been matched on the unpacking
stub or packed section on the standard scan, and on the modified scan the packed sections and stub
are ignored and only unpacked sections are scanned. Another reason might be that the detection
might have been made in the execution simulation on the standard scan, where the behaviour is
analysed. Since this execution simulation is not performed when static unpacking is successful,
those detections are lost. Another consideration that must be taken into account is that when
looking at simulation as an unpacking technique, executables packed several times (several layers
of packers on a given file) can be successfully unpacked. With the current implementation of
the unpacking framework this is not possible, and therefore some detections can be lost in these
situations. Of course it is highly desirable that a very large portion of the samples be detected
by static signature matching alone because of performance. There were also cases in which the
number of signature matches increased for a sample. An increase in signature matches is almost
certainly because of the scan being performed on the unpacked section instead of the packed one.
This means that signatures that were in the database but were not matched to this file due to that
fact that it was packed can now be matched, possibly identifying the sample as very similar to
another that is already present in the database in its unpacked state.
The availability of unpacked data early on in the executable analysis allows for signatures to be
generated over this data and improve the detection rate and performance in the future.
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5.3 Individual Packer Analysis
In the next subsections, the results gathered for each of the unpackers will be presented with the
aid of some tables and charts. The tables and charts presented for each packer were standardized.
Table 5.2 shows the figures and tables and their corresponding meanings. The "Item" value refers
to the item number from the enumeration below that explains the content. For each of the packers
a Figure or Table is referenced to a description of its content.
Table 5.2: Figure meanings
Item no. FSG 2.0 UPX ACProtect 1.41 ASPack 2.12
1 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6
2 Figure 5.5 Figure 5.11 Figure 5.17 Figure 5.23
3 Figure 5.6 Figure 5.12 Figure 5.18 Figure 5.24
4 Figure 5.7 Figure 5.13 Figure 5.19 Figure 5.25
5 Figure 5.9 Figure 5.15 Figure 5.21 Figure 5.27
6 Figure 5.8 Figure 5.14 Figure 5.20 Figure 5.26
7 Figure 5.10 Figure 5.16 Figure 5.22 Figure 5.28
1. This table presents the main measured results. All values asides from the sample count and
the unpack success rate only consider the successfully unpacked samples. Asides from the
measured results that were already explained for Table 5.1 in section 5.2, two more values
are shown: "Total Detection Count Rate" and "Same Detection Rate".
• Same Detection Rate - An average of the percentage of signatures that are present
on both of the following sets: for a set of signatures matched for a sample that was
successfully unpacked using the modified scanner, there is another set of signatures
matched using the standard scanning procedure, for the same sample.
• Total Detection Count Rate - The total number of signatures matched for all samples
that were successfully unpacked using the modified scanner relative to the total number
of signatures matched using the standard scanning procedure, for the same samples.
2. This chart presents the success rate of the unpacker.
3. This chart shows the impact of the new scanning process on signature matching. This chart
compares the signature matches, in number, of the samples where static unpacking was suc-
cessful, with the signature matches of the same sample scanned with the standard scanning
process. That is, if a successfully unpacked sample with the new scanning method had more
or less signature matches compared with the standard scan.
4. This chart presents the comparison of the average speed of the two different scans. It
presents this comparison with two data sets: "Successfully Unpacked" and "Global". As
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the name suggests, "Global" is the whole sample set selected by the PEiD signature. "Suc-
cessfully Unpacked" is the subset of samples from "Global" that were static unpacking was
successful. The fact the simulation still runs when unpacking is unsuccessful explains the
slight increase in time when considering all the samples, compared to only the ones suc-
cessfully unpacked.
5. This chart shows how many scans were faster or slower in the modified scan compared with
the standard scan, from the successfully unpacked samples.
6. This chart presents a comparison in terms of memory usage. There are two sample sets,
same as described before in item 4, this time for peak memory usage
7. This chart shows how many scans used more or less memory in the modified scan compared
with the standard scan, from the successfully unpacked samples.
5.3.1 FSG 2.0 Analysis
Table 5.3: FSG 2.0 Global Results
FSG 2.0 Results
Sample Count 258510
Unpack Success rate 86%
Average Time (relative to old scanning process) 48%
Average Memory (relative to old scanning process) 67%
Old Detection Rate 96%
New Detection Rate 87%
Total Detection Count Rate (relative to old scanning process) 124%
Same Detection Rate 40%
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Figure 5.5: Success rate of the FSG 2.0 unpacker
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Figure 5.6: Analysis of the FSG 2.0 unpacker im-
pact in detection
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As discussed before in section 5.2, the main reasons for unsuccessful unpacking is to do with
incorrect packer identification. In the case of FSG 2.0, several samples that could not be unpacked
were selected at random and manually analysed. They revealed to be packed by FSG 1.33, or not
packed at all, confirming the hypothesis.
The detection rate dropped from 96% to 87%. Meaning 13% of the samples are not detected as
malware using the new scanning process. Although this is true, in total, there were more signature
matches than before, 24% more, most certainly detected in the unpacked data. The same signature
rate of 40% (see section 5.3) is a surprisingly low value. This low value might be attributed
to the fact that signatures found in the unpacked section were possibly not previously matched.
Comparatively, signatures matched on the packed section were not matched in the new scanning
process.
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5.3.2 UPX Analysis
Table 5.4: UPX Global Results
UPX Results
Sample Count 2466228
Unpack Success rate 8%
Average Time (relative to old scanning process) 57%
Average Memory (relative to old scanning process) 60%
Old Detection Rate 99,6%
New Detection Rate 88%
Total Detection Count Rate (relative to old scanning process) 62%
Same Detection Rate 91%
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Figure 5.11: Success rate of the UPX unpacker
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Figure 5.12: Analysis of the UPX unpacker im-
pact in detection
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Figure 5.13: Speed comparison between stan-
dard and UPX unpacking modified scanner
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Figure 5.14: Memory usage comparison between
standard and UPX unpacking modified scanner
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Figure 5.16: For the successfully unpacked sam-
ples, memory usage relative to standard scan
The analysis of the results regarding the unpacking of UPX must take a crucial detail into account:
the standard scan already had static UPX unpacking support. Although this is true, the support
was from an older version of UPX. The new implemented UPX unpacker is able to unpack all the
binaries previously supported as well as the newer versions and bug fixes.
The low success rate (8%) is mostly attributed to the fact that the UPX packer and unpacker is
open-source. This means that anyone wanting to use UPX to protect their executable might do
some slight changes to the packing procedure to render the official UPX unpacker ineffective.
This scenario is a lot more appealing because of the availability of the source code. Another rea-
son for the low success rate was the presence of many unpacked samples in the selected sample
set. Again, these situations were proven by randomly selecting samples that were unsuccessfully
unpacked and analysing them manually.
In the case of UPX, the number of most of the samples’ signature matches either remained the
same or increased. This was to be expected since most of the samples unpacked by the new imple-
mentation were already unpacked in the standard scan. The samples that were not unpacked in the
old implementation had naturally different signature matches. Around 3% had more signatures
matched to them, supporting the hypothesis of this implementation being able to unpack more
samples than before. 8% lost all the signature matches, either because they were not unpacked in
the standard scan or because they were only detected in the simulation phase. Also to be expected
was the high same detection rate (see Table 5.4) since many of the samples involved could already
be unpacked in the previous implementation. The fact that the number of matched signatures went
down in total suggests that indeed there were many samples with signature matches in the simula-
tion phase.
It is easy to see that there is a significant performance improvement with the new scanning process,
for some of the successfully unpacked samples. In global, however, there was a time penalty in
the new UPX unpacker relative to the old one. At the moment of writing, it was not clear why this
time penalty occurs. One possible reason is the new implemented code being slower at dealing
with unknown samples than the old implementation.
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5.3.3 ACProtect 1.41 Analysis
Table 5.5: ACProtect 1.41 Global Results
ACProtect 1.41 Results
Sample Count 1169790
Unpack Success rate 0,015%
Average Time (relative to old scanning process) 59%
Average Memory (relative to old scanning process) 78%
Old Detection Rate 99,99%
New Detection Rate 43%
Total Detection Count Rate (relative to old scanning process) 158%
Same Detection Rate 95%
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Figure 5.17: Success rate of the ACProtect 1.41
unpacker
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Figure 5.18: Analysis of the ACProtect 1.41 un-
packer impact in detection
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standard and ACProtect 1.41 unpacking modified
scanner
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The extremely low (0,015%) success rate observed is mostly attributed to the fact that this par-
ticular PEiD signature is very short and extremely prone to false positives. Given the unusually
low success rate, an attempt was made to try to find a better explanation. Many samples were
selected at random from the set of samples that were not successfully unpacked and were anal-
ysed manually. Not one of the samples analysed was packed with ACProtect, whatever version it
might be. Many UPX packed samples and a few unpacked samples were observed. Although this
might account for most of the situations, it is unlikely that this is the only reason. Considering the
specific challenges posed by this packer and the solutions implemented to solve them, it is likely
that they might have an impact in this issue. Specifically, the decryption of data implemented has
its limitations (see section 4.5). The most obvious limitation is the fact that if the decryption loop
ends or begins within the confines of the array being decrypted; decryption is not successful and
unpacking fails. Although this consideration might have had a significant impact in the results, no
sample could be found that confirmed it.
Most of the samples lost some of the signature matches. Considering that only 176 samples were
successfully unpacked, these numbers have a relatively small statistic relevance. Given the great
loss in detection rate, it is interesting that the total count of signature matches is 58% greater with
the new scanning process. This suggests that the samples that lost all signatures might have had
signature matches in the unpacking stub section with the standard scan.
Even when considering the whole sample set, including the ones where unpacking was unsuccess-
ful, there was still a performance improvement, although less significant.
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5.3.4 ASPack 2.12 Analysis
Table 5.6: ASPack 2.12 Global Results
ASPack 2.12 Results
Sample Count 783149
Unpack Success rate 67%
Average Time (relative to old scanning process) 76%
Average Memory (relative to old scanning process) 109%
Old Detection Rate 94%
New Detection Rate 84%
Total Detection Count Rate (relative to old scanning process) 96%
Same Detection Rate 83%
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Figure 5.23: Success rate of the ASPack 2.12 un-
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Figure 5.24: Analysis of the ASPack 2.12 un-
packer impact in detection
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67% of the were successfully unpacked. Once again, some samples that were unsuccessfully
unpacked were selected at random and analysed manually. Most of them proved to be UPX packed
and other proved to be packed by other versions of ASPack, which, naturally, the implementation
could not unpack.
Considerations about the signature matches made for the previous packers also apply in the case
of ASPack 2.12.
From Figure 5.25, it is clear that there is a significant speed improvement with the new scanning
process. Although, on average, there an increase in memory usage, looking at Figure 5.28 it is
clear that for most of the samples, the memory usage was lower.
5.4 Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter show that, although with varying levels of success, the im-
plemented unpackers were able to unpack real-world malware samples. Considerations on the
effectiveness of the unpackers and on their efficiency and performance were made. Because the
developed framework is to be integrated into the scanning engine of the company, performance
is a big consideration. Asides from the UPX unpacker that was slower on average and ASPack
that used more memory on average, the implemented static unpackers outperformed the dynamic
unpacking done by the simulated execution. Although some of the effectiveness of the scanner
was compromised, this is not necessarily a problem, new signatures can be generated over the
now "visible" sections and improve the detection rate.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Further Work
In this chapter, the project is analysed from the point of view of goals achieved and contributions
made. The results gathered from testing the different implementations are summarised and briefly
discussed. Finally, some suggestions are made for further development and research.
6.1 Achievement of Objectives
In this project, a static unpacking framework was implemented. A clear division was made to the
unpacking framework that reflects the two main phases of unpacking: unpacking and rebuilding
an executable. To this end, two libraries were developed: unpacklib for unpacking data; and un-
packrebuildlib for fixing the imports and rebuilding an executable with the unpacked data from
unpacklib. This division allows access to the unpacked data, without a rebuilt executable. For
purposes of pure signature-based detection, access to the unpacked data is sufficient. Naturally,
if a full-blown executable is needed for deep dynamic analysis, that can be achieved by using the
unpackrebuildlib. Given the amount of different existing packers, the solution was designed with
modularity in mind, allowing for the incremental addition of support for subsequent packers. In
the duration of the project, four different packers were analysed and support for them was imple-
mented in the framework. Due to the lack of availability of unpacking code, most of the packers
had to be reversed and an unpacker implemented (see chapter 4). The first packer to be incorpo-
rated was FSG 2.0 which is simply a compressor that hides the API imports. The second packer
was UPX, another compressor that, being open-source, made implementation simpler. ACProtect
1.41 posed a bigger challenge because of its many protecting features. Also, in the case of ACPro-
tect, an unpacked executable was not produced because it was decided that, given the predicted
effort involved, unpacking of data would suffice. The last packer to be integrated in the duration
of the project was ASPack 2.12, which was also just a compressor.
As far as the goals of the project go, all the goals were met. An unpacking framework was pro-
duced with a modular design. This modular design proved to be appropriate during the integration
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of support for the different packers. Integration of the framework with the company’s malware
scanning engine was done and extensively tested. Testing was done on real malware samples
identified as being packed by PEiD[Sna] signatures. The different packers supported by the un-
packing framework performed differently in testing. 86% of samples identified as being packed
with FSG 2.0 were unpacked successfully. 67% in the case of ASPack 2.12. UPX performed
less well, with only 8% being successfully unpacked. The worst was ACProtect 1.41, in which
only 0,015% of samples were unpacked. A problem that plagued testing was the amount malware
samples that were incorrectly identified as being packed with a packer. Having said this, the suc-
cess of unpacking for the different packers is tightly related to the quality of the PEiD signature,
that is, the amount of false-positives. When the samples did get unpacked, there was an average
performance improvement in all of the packers when compared to the dynamic unpacking solution
of the scanning engine. Time was almost halved and memory usage was reduced in most of the
cases.
Detection rates went down in all cases due to a combination of factors. One factor was the loss
of behavioural signatures, which were not extracted when unpacking was done. Another reason
was the fact that many signatures were previously found in the unpacking stubs. Another factor
was malware packed several times, which the framework does not address. Only the outer layer
of packing is removed in these cases.
The performance improvements provided by the unpacking framework will result in a performance
improvement for the end-user. This improvement is of great importance due to the real-time na-
ture of the normal operating mode of antivirus software. The detection rate drop is an issue that
can be easily addressed by the company. One of the biggest challenges of this project was the
development of unpacking algorithms for the different packers. This was mainly due to the lack
of information about the packer’s behaviour and features. The analyses done in chapter 4 provide
a comprehensive understanding of the packers approached. This information can be potentially
useful for someone looking to unpack or simply understand the said packers.
6.2 Further Work
Several issues are left unsolved with this implementation. The first and most obvious point that
needs further work is the addition of support for more packers. The four packers addressed are
but a drop of water in an ocean of different packers and versions. As of 2008, Symantec had
identified over 2000 different packers belonging to over 200 families[GFC08]. The addition of
more complex packers such as newer versions of Armadillo or Themida would be especially use-
ful due to their protection characteristics. The order by which these packers can be integrated in
the framework could follow the trends of malware in the wild. Meaning that instead of prioritizing
the packers using the simple statistical usage of a database that might have samples that are no
longer observed in the wild, the statistical packer usage could be analysed only on the samples
currently circulating. This change in the order of integration of packers has a bigger impact on the
user since this better reflects the environment the software will ultimately operate in.
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An issue not addressed in the solution implemented is the multi-layered packer problem. That is,
when a file is packed multiple times, forming several packing layers, one on top of the other. This
could be addressed by rebuilding the whole file and re-feeding it into the scanner, allowing for it
to be unpacked again if needed.
One problem that clearly needs to be addressed is the quality of the PEiD signatures. This could
easily be done in the end of the deep analysis of each packer. The insight gained from this analysis
allows for a definition of a good signature.
The signatures lost and gained when scanning unpacked files need to be analysed in detail to ascer-
tain the true reason for the fluctuations. They should be critically reviewed in order to understand
if this behaviour is desired or not. As was the case with all the packers except UPX (since an un-
packer had already been implemented), signatures were found in packed sections and unpacking
stub. This is undesirable and these situations should be reviewed.
Finally, static and dynamic unpacking solutions could be treated as a whole. Treating them as a
whole unpacking solution allows for some interesting unpacking algorithms to be defined. These
might be useful when unpacking more complex packers.
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